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Lilburn in Uniform? A Charter Analysis of 
"Ordered Statements" Under the R.C.M.P. Act 
Craig S. MacMillan* 
R.C.M.P. officers can be ordered to respond in an internal investigation. Although the 
statements are not to be used in any proceeding, no derivative use immunity is 
proscribed. Several constitutional questions are raised: the right against seif-
incrimination, the right to silence, the right to counsel, and the right against arbitrary 
detention. Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada on disclosure and 
impeaching credibility may also invalidate the legislative exclusion of ordered statements 
in subsequent proceedings. Particularly when ordered statements are sanctioned as 
interrogative powers at the investigative stage, the failure to provide derivative use 
immunity leaves ordered statements constitutionally suspect. 
Les agents de la G.R.C. peuvent recevoir l'ordre de repondre aux questions posies !ors 
d'une enquete interne. Mais !es declarations faites ne peuvent pas etre utilisees dans 
d'autres poursuites judiciaires, aucune exception d'usage administratif ou criminel est 
prescrite. Plusieurs questions d' ordre constitutionnel sont soulevees: le droit contre 
!'auto-incrimination, le droit au silence, le droit de consulter un avocat, et le droit contre 
la detention arbitraire. Des declarations recentes par la Cour Supreme du Canada sur la 
revelation et la reclusion de la cridibilite peuvent aussi invalider l' exclusion legislative 
des declarations obtenues "sous ordre" dans des proces subsequents. Particulierement 
lorsque les declarations sont obtenues sous ordre de repondre et sanctionnees en tant 
qu'autorites interrogatrices au niveau de l'enquete. L'omission de fournir a ces 
declarations ainsi donnees l' exemption d'usage derive laisse suspecte leur validite 
constitutionnelle. 
* Dalhousie Law School, LLB. anticipated 1993. The author wishes to thank Mr. John 
Pearson (Director of Public Prosecutions for Nova Scotia) for his supervision. 
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"I am not willing to answer you any more of these questions because I see 
you go about this examination to ensnare me; for seeing the things for 
which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me you will get other 
matters out of my examination; and therefore .. .! shall answer no 
more; ... and of any other matter that you have to accuse me of, I know it is 
warrantable by the law of God, and I think of the law of the land, that I 
may stand upon my just defence and not answer to your interrogations."1 
- John Lilburn before the Court of the Star Chamber, (1637). 
"What we can do as a result of the ordered statement - and even this 
causes us problems from time to time before the courts and with members 
- is go out and get what you might call independent evidence."2 
- R.C.M.P. Commissioner, R.H .. Simmonds, before the 
House of Commons Legislative Committee, (1985). 
For police officers, the statement of Mr. Lilburn before the Court of the Star 
Chamber, over three hundred and fifty years ago, encapsulates one of the 
contemptible features of ordered statements: the obligation of officers to 
incriminate themselves by responding to questions. As a corollary, the former 
Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. adeptly highlights the second: ordered statements 
enable the Force to acquire evidence that can be used against the officer. Given 
this background, it is unusual that the function and validity of "ordered 
statements" has escaped both judicial and academic scrutiny in relation to the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the constitutional validity of the 
1986 amendments to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act' relating to the 
internal investigation of alleged misconduct by R.C.M.P. officers. In particular, 
the focus will be upon s. 40 of the R. C.M. P. Act (Part IV "Discipline"), that sets 
out the procedure for investigating an alleged contravention of the Code of 
Conduct. 5 Section 40(1) of the Act directs an officer or member in charge of a 
detachment to institute an internal investigation where it "appears" that a 
1 Lilburn's Trial (1637-45), 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Star Chamber) at 1318, cited in R.S.M. 
Woods, Police Interrogation (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 59. 
2 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 7(27 November 1985) at 7: 16. 
3 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c.11 [hereinafter the Charter]. 
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10 as am. by R.S.C. 1985, c. 8 (2nd Supp.), s. 16 enacting Part IV, 
inter alia [hereinafter R. C.M.P. Act]; c. R-10 was in principle a re-enactment of the 
revised statute of 1970 until amended by c. 8. 
5 The Code of Conduct is found in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 
1988, S.O.R./88-361 and sets out the standards of conduct and duties for members of the 
R.C.M.P. 
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member has contravened (or is contravening) the Code of Conduct. Section 
40(2) states: 
In any investigation under subsection (1), no member shall be 
excused from answering any question relating to the matter 
being investigated when required to do so by the officer or 
other member conducting the investigation on the ground that 
the answer to the question may tend to criminate the member 
or subject the member to any proceeding or penalty. 
In other words, during an internal investigation the officer under inquiry is 
required to answer any questions that relate to the investigation. Refusing to 
comply with a lawful order is an offence under s. 40 of the Code of Conduct. 
The internal investigation is distinct from a criminal or statutory investigation 
wherein the officer can exercise the right not to provide a statement. Of course, 
given the fact that the officer can be ordered internally to answer questions may 
make this right somewhat transparent. 
Section 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act purports to privilege any ordered 
disclosure by stating that "[n]o answer or statement made in response to a 
question described in subsection (2) shall be used or receivable in any criminal, 
civil or administrative proceeding." This measure is to protect the police officer 
by preventing the formal introduction of the ordered statement into evidence in 
any subsequent proceeding. In other words, the section provides the statement 
with a "use immunity." Any evidence derived from the statement is not 
protected, however, and can be used at a subsequent proceeding. Thus, the 
officer is not afforded "derivative use immunity" under the Act. 
In general, proponents of the ordered statement6 justify this mechanism 
functionally; police management has a right to demand an accounting from its 
employees.7 Nonetheless, critics of the "ordered statement" argue that such a 
measure is unnecessary, and violates the police officer's right to silence and 
right to be free from self-incrimination.8 Concerns have also surfaced about the 
6 Also referred to as "duty," "required" and "accountability" statements; see C. Lewis, S. 
Linden & J. Keene, "Public Complaints Against Police in Metropolitan Toronto - The 
History and Operation of the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner" (1986), 29 
Crim. L. Q. 115; J.R. Hudson, "Police Review Boards and Police Accountability" (1971), 
36 Law and Contemporary Problems 515. 
7 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 11 (I 0 December 1985), at 11: 114. Commissioner 
Simmonds stated that it is not " ... unreasonable to expect an accountability statement from 
a member of the force as to what he has done during his tour of duty." 
8 Ibid. at 11: 113-115. See also: House of Commons Debates (September 1985) at 10511. 
Svend Robinson Member of Parliament, argued for abolition of the ordered statement. 
Supra note 6. Lewis et al., discuss the concerns of officers in this regard. 
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use of ordered statements as a means to obtain (to use former R.C.M.P. 
Commissioner Simmond's term), "independent evidence" (or "derivative 
evidence"9), upon which an investigation can be furthered. The Force could 
then charge the officer for a statutory or internal conduct offence. In effect, s. 40 
permits the Force to expedite a criminal investigation under the guise of an 
internal investigation. 
Without question, the ordered statement is a controversial measure in the 
police profession. The validity of such a mechanism, however, has not been the 
subject of a Charter analysis, probably for two reasons. First, changes in the 
R. C.M.P. Act were not instituted until 1986, at which time the requirement to 
give a statement became explicit in legislation.10 Second, in 1987, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Wigglesworth 11 raised the threshold regarding the 
applicability of the Charter to "private, domestic or disciplinary matters which 
are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily intended to 
maintain discipline." 12 Thus, the protections contained in s. 11 of the Charter 
are not available unless a true criminal proceeding is involved or a conviction 
would lead to a "true penal consequence." 13 This decision severely curtails the 
basis upon which anyone subject to internal disciplinary proceedings can invoke 
certain constitutional protections. For instance, in the case of ordered 
statements, it appears that the police officer cannot refuse to answer questions by 
relying on any of the procedural protections outlined under s. 11 of the Charter. 
The recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Dir. of Investigations and Research), 14 however, 
may have a significant impact on the continued viability of ordered statements in 
relation to s. 7 of the Charter. The Court disagreed fundamentally on the 
constitutionality of the Combines Investigation Act15 provision that required a 
person to attend and answer questions before the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission. The decision offers an important theoretical analysis of the extent 
to which self-incrimination, the right to silence, and the use of derivative 
9 R.J. Marin (Pres.), Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints, Internal 
Discipline and Grievance Procedures within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) [hereinafter the Marin Commission]; see also, supra 
note 8, Robinson, Legislative Committee Minutes, 11: 113-15. 
10 Ibid. at 11:113-115. See also: supra note 7. Lewis et al discuss the concerns of officers 
in this regard. 
11 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 [hereinafter Wigglesworth]. 
12 Ibid. at 560, Wilson, J. 
13 Ibid. at 559. 
14 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 76 C.R. (3d) 129 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers cited to 
S.C.R.]. s. 8 of the Charter was also in issue, but will not form part of this analysis. 
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 17 (nows. 19) [further references will be to this enactment]; 
continued under the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. 
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evidence are interdependent and protected under s. 7 of the Charter. This forms 
one of the foundations for evaluating the validity of s. 40(2) of the R. C.M.P. Act. 
In addition, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Kuldip 16 on the use of testimony in previous judicial proceedings, and R. v. 
Stinchcombe17 discussing disclosure requirements, raise questions regarding the 
purported veil created bys. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act. As will become evident, 
officers may be ill-advised to rely on s. 40 to prevent the use of their statements 
or their contents in a proceeding. 
The integral relationship of statutory and internal investigations will be 
critical in determining if there is a constitutional basis upon which to question 
the validity of ordered statements. Despite the statutory compartmentalization 
of the various investigations under the R.C.M.P. Act, a criminal investigation 
frequently proceeds concurrently with the internal matter. Thus, reference to the 
possible criminal implications that are attached to an ordered statement will be a 
recurring theme throughout this paper. In the end, the issue is whether the 
Charter will permit an officer to refuse to answer any questions, or in the 
alternative, whether any constitutional restriction on the use of derivative 
evidence exists. 
SECTION 11 OF THE CHARTER AND INTERNAL DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS 
The Wigglesworth Case18 
Before 1986, a member of the R.C.M.P. convicted of a "Major Service Offence" 
under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act19 was subject, by virtue of s. 
36(1), to one or more of the following punishments: a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year; a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars; loss of pay for a 
period not exceeding thirty days; reduction in rank; loss of seniority or 
reprimand. Punishment for a "Minor Offence" under s. 36(2) could include: 
confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding thirty days; dismissal and 
fine not exceeding three hundred dollars; fine not exceeding fifty dollars; and 
l6 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 618 [hereinafter Kuldip]. 
17 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
18 Supra note 11. 
19 The provisions of R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9, were simply re-stated inc. R-10 of the 1985 
revised statutes; s. 25 defined "major service offences," and s. 26 "minor offences." It 
should be noted that members of the R.C.M.P. under s. 27 who had committed, were 
found committing, suspected of, or charged with a service offence were subject to arrest 
under the Act. In addition, s. 28 permitted the Force to hold the member in custody until 
trial for an internal offence. These invasive provisions were in place until amended in 
1986 by c. 8. 
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loss of seniority or reprimand. 
Wigglesworth was an R.C.M.P. officer charged with common assault under 
the Criminal Code20 for slapping an "uncooperative" motorist during an 
investigation for impaired driving. Prior to being tried on the assault, the officer 
was charged, found guilty, and fined for a Major Service Offence by an 
R.C.M.P. Service Court. At the subsequent criminal trial, the judge quashed the 
common assault information under s. 24(1) of the Charter, reasoning that the 
officer was being tried twice for the same misconduct, contrary to s. 1 l(h) of the 
Charter. 21 The issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the 
conviction of Cst. Wigglesworth for the Major Service Offence precluded a 
further trial under the Criminal Code, since the second proceeding would be a 
violation of the right not to be tried twice for the same offence (commonly 
known as double jeopardy), accorded bys. 1 l(h) of the Charter. 
As noted by Eberts, Madame Justice Wilson adopted a clear "functional and 
philosophical distinction between disciplinary matters and those proceedings 
affecting society at large."22 Writing for the majority, Wilson, J. found that 
"[p]roceedings of an administrative nature instituted for the protection of the 
public in accordance with the policy of a statute" were not the type of "offence 
proceedings" to which s. 11 of the Charter applied.23 The court envisioned two 
circumstances in which someone can invoke s. 11: where the proceeding by "its 
very nature .. .is a criminal proceeding," or, in a situation where a finding of guilt 
"may lead to a true penal consequence."24 A true penal consequence, for the 
purposes of s. 11, occurs when the individual is subject to "imprisonment or a 
fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed for the purpose of 
redressing the wrong done to society at large rather than to the maintenance of 
internal discipline."25 In this regard, a factor in evaluating the true penal 
consequence would be that service offence fines were paid to the R.C.M.P., 
instead of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the government. In any event, a 
member of the R.C.M.P. was subject to imprisonment, thereby meeting the penal 
consequences branch of the test. 
In the end, however, Wigglesworth was not given the benefit of s. 1 l(h) of 
20 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 245(1). 
21 The Sask. Court of Queen's Bench disagreed and permitted an appeal, finding that the 
assault and service offence constituted separate offences; see (1984), 38 C.R. (3d) 388 
(Sask Q.B.). A further appeal to the Sask. C.A. was dismissed. 
22 M. Eberts, "Section 7 of the Charter Plus Natural Justice: An Administrative Justice 
Section 11," 101 at 106 in N.R. Finkelstein and B.M. Rogers, eds., Administrative 
Tribunals and The Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1990). 
23 Wigglesworth, supra note 11 at 560. 
24 Ibid. at 559. 
25 Ibid. at 561. 
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the Charter, because the majority, following the distinction in Kienapple v. The 
Queen, 26 found he was not being tried for the same offence. The Major Service 
Offence was an internal accountability matter, whereas the criminal offence was 
to "account to society at large" for his conduct.27 In dissent, Estey, J. postulated 
that the protection of s. 11 could arise if the conviction before the first tribunal 
was performed as part of a legislated task that permitted a penalty recognizing 
the "general public's interest in the administration of criminal law ... over and 
above the limited interest of internal discipline."28 
A trilogy of police discipline cases from Ontario,29 reported at the same time 
as the Wigglesworth decision, removed any lingering doubt that s. 11 of the 
Charter is inapplicable to "domestic, internal or disciplinary matters which are 
of a regulatory nature designed to maintain discipline and professional 
integrity. " 30 
Legislative Developments 
In the aftermath of Wigglesworth, it is evident that the Supreme Court had 
promulgated a test which restricts severely, if not eliminates, the application of 
the protections enshrined in s. 11 of the Charter to the administrative-discipline 
process. Although the Supreme Court found that s. 11 was available in 
Wigglesworth, the R. C.M.P. Act was the subject of several significant changes, 
one of which was the removal of the fine and imprisonment provisions contained 
in the earlier Act. These former punishments were replaced by a two tier 
remedial disciplinary system wherein a member can be dealt with either by an 
"Informal Disciplinary Action," or a "Formal Disciplinary Action," depending 
on the gravity and surrounding circumstances of the Code of Conduct 
contravention. 
26 [1975] I S.C.R. 729 [hereinafter Kienapple]. 
27 Wigglesworth supra note 11 at 566. 
28 Ibid. at 570. 
29 The Supreme Court of Canada found in Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 572 (sub nom. Burnham v. Ackroyd) thats. I l(d) of the Charter 
(independence and impartiality of a tribunal) did not apply to Police Act R.S.O., c. 381 as 
per Reg. 791 R.R.O. 1980 (creating the Code of Offences) disciplinary proceedings 
involving "discreditable conduct" because they were not "criminal in nature nor did they 
involve penal consequences" (Wilson, J. at 575). The Ontario legislation governing 
police did not have imprisonment provisions. The independence and impartiality of police 
disciplinary tribunals was also challenged under s. 1 l(d) of the Charter in Trumbley & 
Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577 (sub nom. Re Trumbley) and 
Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582 with the same result- i.e. s. 11 
did not apply to the forum of internal/domestic discipline. 
30 W.J. Atkinson, "The Independence and Impartiality of Administrative Tribunals After 
the Charter" in Finkelstein and Rogers, eds., supra note 22, 87 at 93. 
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Under s. 41(1) of the R.C.M.P. Act, informal disciplinary action can consist 
of counselling, special training, professional counselling, recommendation for 
transfer, close supervision, forfeiture of time off not exceeding one day, and 
reprimand. In accordance with s. 45.12(3), where an Adjudication Board (the 
internal discipline proceeding) decides that a Code of Conduct contravention is 
established, it can impose any one or more of the following sanctions: dismissal, 
direction to resign, demotion, forfeiture of pay for a period not exceeding ten 
work days, and any of the informal actions noted above. 31 These amendments 
have removed the "true penal consequences" that existed under the previous 
scheme, thereby ensuring thats. 11 of the Charter will not apply to the R.C.M.P. 
disciplinary process. 
Another consideration in the application of s. 11 of the Charter to ordered 
statements is the condition that the person be "charged with an offence". Even 
if the internal disciplinary offence was one that met either the criminal or true 
penal consequences branch for the inurance of s. 11, in many cases the officer 
will not have been "charged" with an offence, because most ordered statements 
will be required at the pre-charge or investigative stage. Therefore, under s. 
ll(c) of the Charter, there is no basis to assert that the officer "cannot be 
compelled to be a witness in proceedings against" that officer. The significance 
of distinguishing between a testimonial and investigative compulsion was 
understood even prior to the decision in Wigglesworth. As R.C.M.P. 
Commissioner Simmonds observed before the Legislative Committee dealing 
with the proposed changes to the R.C.M.P. Act, s. 11 would not apply to ordered 
statements because the member would not be "charged."32 Thus, the term 
"proceedings" has been limited to "compelled testimony," and, has not been 
judicially extended to prevent conscription at the investigative stage of offences. 
Protecting persons at the investigative stage has, in part, been assumed in the 
right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.33 
These limits underscore the artificial distinction made in the application of 
s. 11 not only to police, but also all disciplinary proceedings in general. Rogers 
has concluded that: 
3l In some cases there is a variance in the sanction based on the rank of the member. 
"Officers" (i.e. commissioned rank) are only recommended for demotion or dismissal by 
the Board, while non-commissioned officers can be demoted (Inspectors and Constables 
are excepted from demotion under subsection (5)); sees. 2 for definitions. 
32 Supra note 2 at 11:115. 
33 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 14. See also, R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.CR. 151 
[hereinafter Hebert]; R. v. Esposito (1985), 53 0.R. (2d) 356 (Ont. C.A.) [leave to appeal 
to the S.C.C. refused 65 N.R. 244] where the court specifically found thats. 1 l(c) of the 
Charter only applies to being compelled to testify and has no application to "questioning" 
by the police. 
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[S]imply pinning labels of "administrative" or "criminal" on 
impugned conduct is not the way for courts to proceed. What 
is called for is a careful examination of the conduct itself and 
the rights affected, within the particular statutory scheme.34 
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A review of the current R. C.M.P. Act does not disclose any investigational 
conditions on the use of ordered statements, other than the invocation of an 
internal investigation. The mere fact that the authority to order an officer to give 
a statement is limited to an "investigation" under s. 40(1) is little assurance this 
mechanism could not be used improperly. 
Asserting that an ordered statement can only be used during internal 
investigations, which may result in an Adjudication Board hearing, belies the 
fact that a criminal investigation may also be underway, followed by an 
R.C.M.P. Public Complaints Commission (an independent-civilian review) 
investigation or public inquiry or both.35 In addition, a "Board of Inquiry" may 
be struck by the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. or the Solicitor General under s. 
24.1 to "investigate and report on any matter connected with the organization, 
training, conduct, performance of duties, discipline, efficiency, 
administration ... of the Force or affecting any member" (emphasis added). It is 
also possible that the officer may have a "grievance" relating to the actions of 
the Force, which may ultimately have to be resolved by a hearing before the 
R.C.M.P. External Review Committee, by authority of s. 34(4) of the R.C.M.P. 
Act. Although varying levels of protection are offered, in all instances, 
testimony before the Board of Inquiry, the P.C.C., and the E.R.C. is required, 
irrespective of any incrimination. Of course, the member may also be the 
subject of a civil suit. 
The context in which the ordered statements operate is extremely 
complicated. Eberts illuminates the complexity and unsettled nature of 
administrative procedures in general: 
There exists nowhere in administrative law any formal 
mechanism for determining an order of precedence among 
these various kinds of proceedings, for preventing abuse of 
34 B.M. Rogers, "Charter Limits on Administrative Investigative Powers," in Finkelstein 
and Rogers, supra note 22, 129 at 130. 
35 Part VI of the R.C.M.P. Act established the P.C.C., which, if not satisfied with the 
Force's disposition of a complaint, may, by virtue of s. 45.42(3)(c), investigate a public 
complaint or institute a public hearing to inquire into the complaint. See also, the "Public 
Complaints Against the RCMP" brochure (Canada: Supply and Services, 1988); 
R.C.M.P. P.C.C., Annual Report 1989-90 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990). 
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multiplicity of proceedings, or for safeguarding the rights of a 
respondent.36 
The constitutional door was not closed in Wigglesworth, however, as 
Wilson, J. declared that "constitutionally guaranteed procedural protections may 
be available in a particular case under s. 7 of the Charter, although s. 11 is not 
available."37 
GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING SELF-INCRIMINATION 
In 1882, the Court of Queen's Bench in Lamb v. Munster, 38 found that the 
common law recognized that persons were not required to answer any questions 
during a civil discovery process for libel, if they swore that the answer may tend 
to incriminate them in a criminal prosecution. The New Brunswick Supreme 
Court, in 1963, affirmed that no person can be compelled to incriminate him or 
herself at common law, and "[n]o abrogation or curtailment of the common law 
privilege can be effected save through legislation couched in clear and explicit 
terms."39 Section 40(2) of the R.C.M.P. Act explicitly states that "no member 
shall be excused from answering ... on the ground that the answer ... may tend to 
criminate the member or subject the member to any proceeding or penalty." 
There seems to be little doubt about the "explicit" nature of subsection (2). 
Section 40(3) of the R. C.M.P. Act attempts to provide some redress for the 
denial of the common law protection by proclaiming that an internal statement 
will not be used in a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding (use immunity), 
except where the member knowingly gives a false or misleading statement to the 
investigator. 40 
36 Supra note 22 at 105. 
37 Supra note 11 at 562. 
38 (1882-3) 10 Q.B.D. 110, (1881-85), All E.R. 465 (Q.B.). 
39 Sweezy v. Crystal Chemicals Ltd. (1963), 50 M.P.R. 30 at 35 (N.B.S.C. A.D.). See 
also, R. v. Amato, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418; R. v. Jobidon [1991], 2 S.C.R. 714 at 736 per 
Gonthier, J. 
40 It should also be noted that s. 8(3) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
recognizes that common Jaw defences, justifications, and excuses are still available in 
Canada, to the extent they remain unaltered and consistent with any Act of Parliament. 
As noted by Gonthier, J., in R. v. Jobidon, supra note 39 at 736, there has been "little 
judicial analysis of this section of the Code ... [and] the references made to it have 
predominantly concerned exceptional circumstances which provide defences or which 
deny certain features of an offence." Gonthier, J. (at 258) recognizes that s. 8(3) can 
interact with the common law to develop "entirely new defences not inconsistent with the 
Code" or to give meaning to justifications and defences, which may provide a basis to 
argue that ordered statements or derivative evidence cannot be used in criminal 
proceedings contrary to the common law. This seems possible given the fact that four 
members of the Supreme Court concurred with Gonthier, J. while essentially reading a 
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Section 40(2) resembles s. 5(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, 41 which states: 
No witness shall be excused from answering any question on 
the ground that the answer to the question may tend to 
criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability to a civil 
proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person 
(emphasis added). 
It is settled in Canada thats. 5(1) has abolished the common law privilege 
of a "witness" (i.e. someone not charged) to refuse to answer questions in a 
proceeding which may tend to incriminate.42 As noted by Dickson, J. (as he then 
was) in Marcoux & Solomon v. The Queen, the privilege against self-
incrimination "extends to the accused qua witness and not qua accused, it is 
concerned with testimonial compulsion specifically and not with compulsion 
generally."43 Since 1982, however, if the person is charged with a criminal 
offence, s. 11 ( c) of the Charter provides that the accused cannot be compelled to 
be a witness and testify against him or herself in that proceeding. The "charged" 
exception was also recognized earlier under s. 4(1) of the Canada Evidence Act. 
The result, as noted by Schiff, is thats. 1 l(c) and s. 4(1), "give an accused 
[charged] person the power to choose whether to testify" (emphasis added).44 
Section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act provides that a witness's 
testimony cannot be used subsequently if the witness objects to the question. It 
remains to be seen if questioning an officer qua suspect (i.e. not charged) in an 
internal investigation will be a consideration for the court under s. 7 of the 
Charter. 
Section 2(d) of the Canadian Bill of Rights45 states that "no law of Canada 
new intent into the assault provisions of the Criminal Code, which created a new offence; 
for a comment see, S.J. Usprich, "Annotation" (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 235. It would be open 
to debate whether self-incrimination is a common law principle envisioned by s. 8(3); 
nevertheless, it appears unassailable that s. 40(2) has abrogated the common law right not 
to answer incriminating questions. Thus, to the degree that declining to answer is 
inconsistent with the R.C.M.P. Act, the common law privilege or justification for not 
answering would be nullified by the Criminal Code. In any event, it is clear that the 
common law privilege against self-incrimination was to be abrogated by s. 40(2) of the 
R.C.M.P. Act. 
41 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
42 See e.g., R. v. Dubois, (1985] 2 S.C.R. 356 at 362, per Lamer, J. (as he then was). See 
also Di Iorio & Fontaine v. Montreal Jail Warden, [1978] l S.C.R. 152 (sub nom. Di 
Iorio & Fontaine v. Warden of the Common Jail of Montreal and Brunett), supra note 34, 
Rogers at 135; M. Mcinnes, "The Right To Silence In the Presence of Anton Pillar: A 
Question of Self Incrimination" (1987-88), 26 Alta. L.R. 332. 
43 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763 at 769. 
44 S. Schiff, Evidence In The litigation Process, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 
at 946. 
45 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III. 
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shall be construed or applied so as to ... authorize a court or tribunal, commission, 
board or other authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is 
denied ... protection against self crimination" (emphasis added). In Curr v. R.46, 
Laskin, J. (as he then was), declined to find a general right against self-
incrimination beyond that set out in s. 2(d) of the Bill of Rights. Curr is 
authority for the testimonial right against self-incrimination operating before a 
criminal court, and for the proposition that any statutory provision compelling a 
witness to testify must be accompanied by criminatory protection.47 The Bill of 
Rights has not figured prominently in the post-Charter era,48and given the 
restriction in Curr making it consistent with the Canada Evidence Act, it is 
evident that ordered statements would not be subjected to any meaningful 
redress here. 
The Charter states that any incriminating testimony by a witness cannot be 
used in any subsequent proceedings. Unlikes. 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, 
s. 13 of the Charter provides protection for a witness's incriminatory testimony 
without an objection by the witness.49 The fundamental problem, of course, is 
that neither provision extends beyond a "testimonial privilege," or in other 
words, before the proceeding to the investigative stage. More importantly, as 
Whitten points out, s. 13 of the Charter does not preclude the use of derivative 
evidence.50 Moreover, as will be seen, the courts have eroded the protection 
provided in s. 13 by permitting the Crown to use previous testimony in a 
subsequent proceeding to impeach credibility. 
Distinctions Between Proceedings and Ordered Statements 
It is clear that a witness can be compelled to appear before an administrative 
board and provide testimony subject to exclusion in subsequent proceedings. 
The testimony may, however, disclose damaging evidence that can lead to 
serious consequences, such as criminal charges. Although there can be similar 
consequences when disclosing derivative evidence, either before an 
administrative proceeding or in an ordered statement (i.e. a charge), there are 
three important distinctions. First, the ordered statement is not obtained in the 
46 [1972] S.C.R. 889 at 910. 
47 Ibid. at 912. 
48 Although Beetz, J. did rely on the Bill of Rights in Singh v. Can. (Min. of Employment 
and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, to strike down federal legislation dealing with the 
immigration process that denied certain claimants a right to a full hearing, there has been 
little judicial activity otherwise in this regard. 
49 Section 13 states: "A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have 
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate the witness in any other 
proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury." 
50 A. Whitten, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1986) 29 Crim. L.Q. 66 at 83. 
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context of a "proceeding," which substantially alters the forum under 
consideration. How is the internal investigator to be held accountable given the 
non-existence of any external judicial review of the acquisition process? There 
is neither a transcript of the process, (other than the statement), nor a public or 
quasi-public nature to the procedure. There is no monitoring mechanism or 
independent adjudicator to ensure the officer is receiving fair treatment. A 
member of the R.C.M.P. can be the subject of an interrogation in a context 
which is not even remotely associated with the limited "proceeding" safeguards 
afforded by the Charter and Canada Evidence Act when a witness is called upon 
to testify. Second, an internal investigation, and attending ordered statement, 
can be instituted where it merely appears there has been a contravention of the 
Code of Conduct. This threshold is very low. Third, under s. 40(1), the member 
is not being questioned as a "witness,''51 he or she is under investigation as an 
"accused" on the basis that it "appears" there has been a contravention of the 
Code of Conduct. This distinction is even more striking when a criminal 
investigation is in parallel to the disciplinary investigation. 
SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER AND SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Criminal Context 
Even before the Charter, the law was settled that a person charged with a 
criminal offence could not be compelled to testify against him or herself at 
trial. 52 This common law principle was further enshrined in the Charter. The 
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self under s. 1 l(c) (ands. 4(1) 
C.E.A.), however, is limited to persons charged in the criminal trial process. 
The judicial distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the right to silence is sometimes difficult to perceive. Without mentioning s. 7, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Esposito,53 found that there is a common 
law right to remain silent at both the investigative and trial stage of the criminal 
process. Further, the right to silence, possessed by an accused person in the 
criminal context, was proclaimed a "tenet of our legal system" in R. v. 
Woolley. 54 Probably one of the clearer judicial statements regarding 
incrimination and silence is found in R. v. Greig, where Dupont, J. of the 
Ontario High Court asserted: 
51 Supra note 2, Commissioner Simmonds advised the Legislative Committee on Bill C-
65 that the legal advice regarding the self-crimination provisions of s. 13 of the Charter 
indicated that it did not apply to the member, as they were not a "witness." 
52 R.E. Salhany, A Basic Guide to Evidence in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 
at 11. See also supra note l at 60. 
53 Supra note 33 at 362. 
54 (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 531 at 539 (Ont. C.A.), Cory, J.A. 
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The accused's common law right to remain silent, which is 
historically linked to the presumption of innocence and the 
right against self-incrimination, is one of the pillars of the 
criminal justice system (emphasis added).55 
It was not until the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Hebert56 that 
conclusive Charter guidance was provided about the right to silence and self-
incrimination under s. 7. 57 The stage for an analysis of the right to silence and 
incrimination had been set in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,58 where Lamer, J. 
interpreted the phrase "principles of fundamental justice." It was found that ss. 
8 to 14 of the Charter were specific illustrations of the principles of fundamental 
justice to be accorded in criminal and penal law under s. 7.59 Lamer, J. 
concluded in the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act reference that: 
[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the 
basic tenets and principles of our legal system, not only our 
judicial process, but also of the other components of our legal 
system .... [w]hether any given principle may be said to be a 
principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7 will 
rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, rationale and 
essential role of that principle within the judicial process and 
in our legal system as it evolves.60 
Returning to Hebert, McLachlin, J. writing for the majority, reviewed the 
jurisprudence on the right to silence. She concluded that s. 7 is founded on two 
common law principles: the "confessions rule" (involuntary statements are 
inadmissible), and, the "privilege against self-incrimination" (the accused is not 
required to testify at trial). 61 Thus, a person "in the power of the state in the 
course of the criminal process has the right to choose whether to speak to the 
police or to remain silent."62 It is on this basis that McLachlin, J.finds that: 
From a practical point of view, the relationship between the 
privilege against self-incrimination and right to silence at the 
investigational stage is equally clear. The protection conferred 
55 (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 229 at 237. 
56 Supra note 33. 
57 Section 7 states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice." 
58 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 48 C.R. (3d) 289 (sub nom. Ref. Re Sec. 94(2) of Motor Vehicle 
Act). 
59 Ibid. at 502. 
60 Ibid. at 512-513. See also, R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, wherein the court states 
that legal principles can be reflected in legislative history. 
61 Supra note 56 at 164. 
62 Ibid. 
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by a legal system which grants the accused immunity from 
incriminating himself at trial but offers no protection with 
respect to pre-trial statements would be illusory.63 
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The court recognized "that an accused person has no obligation to give 
evidence against himself ... there is a right to choose."64 The majority limited the 
scope of the right to silence (the choice to speak to the authorities), as it relates 
to police interrogation and the use of undercover operators, to that period of time 
when the person is in detention. It was on this point that Sopinka and Wilson, 
JJ. parted with the majority. Justice Wilson declared that if the purpose of the s. 
7 right to silence were to be achieved: 
[It] must arise whenever the coercive power of the state is 
brought to bear upon the citizen ... this could well predate 
detention and extend to the police interrogation of a suspect. 65 
From this analysis, it is evident that the courts have evolved a right to 
silence and non-incrimination in the criminal process that is triggered at the 
moment an individual is "subjected to the coercive powers of the state," simply 
by virtue of detention. 66 An interesting dilemma is created for the courts. A 
police officer providing a statement under an "order" cannot leave the presence 
of the investigating officer until such time as the questioning is completed, yet 
the officer is being detained within the context of an "administrative" process, 
and not the criminal process per se. The question is whether an internal 
statement also provides the officer with a right to choose under s. 7 of the 
Charter. 
The Administrative Context 
The Canadian judiciary has not always been comfortable with the witness-
accused dichotomy, particularly where an administrative inquiry can, for the 
most part, be substituted for the criminal proceeding. For example, in Batary v. 
A.G. of Saskatchewan,67 the Supreme Court of Canada found that someone 
charged with murder could not be compelled to attend and testify with respect to 
the circumstances of the death at a coroner's inquest. Such testimony would 
have enabled the prosecution to usurp the accused's privilege against 
incrimination and right to silence. It was the view of Cartwright, J. that the 
63 Ibid. at 174. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. at 190. 
66 Broyles v. The Queen, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 at 606 as per Iacobucci,i J. [hereinafter 
Broyles] 
67 [1965] S.C.R. 465, Cartwright, J. 
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Canada Evidence Act did not have the effect of making an accused compellable 
at an inquest.68 
Since 1892, the coroner's inquest has not been part of the criminal justice 
structure in Quebec. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada in Faber v. The 
Queen69 found that individuals were compellable and examinable. In a five to 
four judgment, the majority found that the coroner's inquiry was neither 
concerned with the investigation of crime, nor was it a trial with an "accused," 
because the witness had not been charged.70 The dissent, led by Pigeon, J., were 
of the mind that the coroner's inquisition was not sufficiently delineated from 
the criminal structure to find that it had no criminal jurisdiction, particularly 
when the sole purpose was to determine who might be charged with the crime. 
Two years later, the issue of compelling testimony before an administrative-
investigative tribunal arose again in Di Iorio & Fontaine v. Montreal Jail 
Warden,71 where the appellants were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to 
one year in gaol for refusing to testify before a commission of inquiry into 
organized crime in Quebec. The Supreme Court found, based on Faber, that if 
an inquiry can be held to determine who could be charged with murder, it would 
be no less permissible to identify persons involved with organized crime. 
Justice Dickson (as he then was), brusquely declared that "[w]hether or not one 
agrees with a result which may force a person to assist in an investigation of his 
criminal activity, the provisions of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act ... compel 
such a result."72 
In dissent, Laskin, C.J.C. expressed concern that the province, in the form 
of an administrative commission, could do "wholesale" what the Criminal Code 
did "retail." Although this analysis is premised on the division of powers in 
relation to criminal law, there seems to be an implicit concern that the province 
could use the administrative-investigatory mechanism to impose disclosure on 
individuals in the criminal context. It is evident then, that prior to the Charter, 
the Supreme Court was not receptive to a broad application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, despite the apparent discomfort this caused for some. 
Early in the history of the Charter, however, Scheibe!, J. of the 
68 The criminal law in force in Saskatchewan was that of England as it existed in 1870, 
subject to any subsequent alterations or modifications by Parliament; in this case the 
criminal law had not been amended, as it pertained to Saskatchewan, to permit the 
examination of someone charged with murder by the coroner. Ibid. at 475-79. 
69 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 9. 
70 Ibid. at 33, de Grandpre, J. 
71 Supra note 42. The primary issue, which is not as important here, was whether the 
province was engaged in criminal law, thereby making the commission ultra vires and 
unconstitutional under the division of powers. 
n Ibid. at 222. 
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, included administrative proceedings in 
his analysis of self-incrimination under s. 7. He stated in R.L. Crain Inc. v. 
Couture & Restrictive Trade Practices Commission: 
An administrative inquiry, on the other hand, may be directed 
at uncovering illegal activity on the part of the witness. The 
denial of that witness's privilege against self-incrimination in 
this situation may result in the witness being compelled to 
assist in an investigation into his criminal activity.73 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed with this approach, and, in 
Haywood Securities Inc. v. Inter-Tech Resource Group Inc.,74 the majority found 
that s. 7 of the Charter did not provide a general right against self-incrimination, 
insofar as ss. l l(c) and 13 established the extent to which such protection would 
be available. 
In light of the Charter, new battle lines were drawn over the right of the 
state to compel individuals or corporations to attend before an administrative 
board to answer questions, even though such answers may incriminate the 
person or provide the state with a tool to "discover" the evidence upon which a 
charge could be laid. Since s. 11 rights were not necessarily applicable to quasi-
criminal or disciplinary proceedings (Wigglesworth), judicial clarification on the 
nature of self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter was required. 
The Thomson Newspapers Case 
When faced with an opportunity to rule conclusively on the scope of the 
right to silence and self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter in the quasi-
criminal process, the Supreme Court was unable elucidate a clear majority 
judgment. In Thomson Newspapers ,75 the appellant newspaper was served with 
orders to appear before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to answer 
questions and produce documents; the R.T.P.C. would thus be able to determine 
whether evidence existed that the corporation had committed the indictable 
offence of predatory pricing contrary to the Combines Investigation Act (now 
Competition Act).16 
Both LaForest and L'Heureux-Dube, JJ. found thats. 7 of the Charter was 
not violated. Sopinka and Wilson, JJ. held thats. 7 had been breached, and the 
impugned measure was not saved under s. 1 of the Charter. Lamer, J. (as he 
then was), found it was inappropriate to deal with s. 7 in this instance. This 
73 (1983), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478 at 512. 
74 [1986] 2 W.W.R. 289. 
75 Supra note 14. 
76 Supra note 15. 
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same division arose in Stelco Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),71 which was decided at the 
same time and involved the same issues and legislation. 
Although LaForest, J. found that s. 7 can protect individuals from adverse 
self-incriminatory results not covered by s. 13 ors. ll(c) of the Charter, any 
such protection must be analyzed in the context of these sections. In his view, 
an absolute right to refuse to answer questions would create a "dangerous and 
unnecessary imbalance" between ihe rights of the individual and society.78 
Upon reviewing the "inquisitorial" nature of the process, and the fact that the 
Canada Evidence Act has recognized for almost one hundred years that the 
privilege of self-incrimination extends only to "testimonial immunity," (and not 
derivative use immunity), LaForest, J. concluded that s. 7 does not extend to 
"evidence derived from compelled testimony."79 Justice LaForest asserted, by 
analogy to the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis used under the Charter, that there is a 
distinction between derivative evidence that exists independently of the 
compelled testimony which could be discovered independent of the testimony 
(i.e. the "real" evidence analysis) and evidence that would be virtually 
undiscoverable without the incriminatory testimony (i.e. "conscripted" 
evidence). 
In response to the conscripted evidence scenario, LaForest, J. posited that 
"undiscoverable" derivative evidence obtained from compelled testimony can, in 
some cases, be excluded by the trial judge where its admission would "violate 
the principles of fundamental justice" by creating an unfair trial.80 Admission of 
independently existing evidence does not affect the fairness of the trial, and as 
such, any compelled testimony that identifies the evidence does not breach s. 7. 
It is not explained how this ad hoc reliance on the common law rule of 
exclusion for derivative evidence, obtained through self-incriminatory 
testimony, coincides with the right not to be deprived of the protection of s. 7. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube, on the other hand, relied on the traditional witness-
charged dichotomy to find that s. 7 does not afford a constitutional right of 
silence and non-incrimination for "witnesses."81 In her view, the Charter has 
not created an unassailable right against self-incrimination. Rather, it has 
"preserved the division of the rules"82 regarding witnesses and compellability 
under ss. l l(c) and 13. With regard to derivative evidence, L'Heureux-Dube, J. 
noted that the Canada Evidence Act never extended beyond the "actual 
77 Supra note 14. 
78 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 14 at 541. 
79 Ibid. at 547-548. 
80 Ibid. at 561. 
81 Ibid. at 574. 
82 Ibid. at 581. 
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testimony" of the witness, and derivative evidence improperly obtained from an 
accused in pre-Charter cases was routinely admitted.83 
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube concluded that "[t]here is no inflexible 
rule that the admission of derivative evidence will affect the fairness of the 
judicial process."84 As a result, s. 7 does not contain a derivative use immunity 
in relation to witnesses compelled to appear before boards of inquiry and related 
agencies. In the end, both LaForest and L'Heureux-Dube, JJ. find that it is not a 
principle of fundamental justice that individuals be afforded a blanket immunity 
from self-incrimination in these circumstances. 
Conversely, Wilson, J. held that any discernment between an investigatory 
versus prosecutorial process is "irrelevant when a criminal prosecution is a 
potential consequence of the .. .investigation"85 (emphasis added). After 
canvassing several Commonwealth jurisdictions ahd the United States, she 
concluded that the only way to protect a person from being "conscripted" and 
having derivative evidence utilized from an investigatory proceeding, is to 
exclude such evidence. Wilson, J. rejected the s. 24(2) analogy: 
[The discretion of the judge is] no guarantee of protection 
against the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a 
witness's compelled testimony .... exclusion must be a matter of 
principle and of right, not of discretion. 86 
The purpose of s. 7 is to protect witnesses from the use of derivative evidence in 
any subsequent criminal proceeding, to the extent that ss. 1 l(c) and 13 are 
unavailable. Madame Justice Wilson concluded that: 
Where a person's right to life, liberty and security of the 
person is either violated or threatened, the principles of 
fundamental justice require that such evidence not be used in 
order to conscript the person against himself (emphasis 
added).87 
Turning to s. 1 of the Charter, Wilson, J. asserted that any legislative 
measure that breaches a principle of fundamental justice will be almost 
impossible to support as demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society88 - which is her finding here. 
In agreeing with the reasons of Wilson, J., Justice Sopinka observed that: 
83 Ibid. at 581. See e.g.: R. v. Wray [1971] S.C.R. 272. 
84 Thomson Newspapers, ibid. at 582. 
85 Ibid. at 461. 
86 Ibid. at 483. 
87 Ibid. at 484. 
88 Ibid. at 487. 
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[The right to remain silent under s. 7] is a right not to be 
compelled to answer questions or otherwise communicate with 
police officers or others whose function it is to investigate the 
commission of criminal offenses. The protection afforded by 
the right is not designed to protect the individual from the 
police qua [sic] police, but from the police as investigators of 
criminal activity.89 
Lamer, J. was of the view that the wrong section of the legislation had been 
challenged, as it was not the contempt punishment for a refusal to answer that 
was in issue, but the enactment that ultimately removed the right to refuse to 
answer under the common law.90 He declined to pronounce on the s. 7 issue, 
since this would by inference lead to a judicial statement on s. 5 of the Canada 
Evidence Act. If this were known to the other Attorney Generals, there would 
probably have been further interventions. Justice Lamer conditioned these 
observations on the assumption that he agrees with Wilson, J. that it is a 
principle of fundamental justice that a witness may refuse to give incriminating 
testimony .. 
The result, as described by Gold, is that compulsory state questioning 
violates s. 7. Where testimony is compelled despite any objections over self-
incrimination, s. 1 will require either subsequent use and derivative use 
immunity (Justices Wilson, Sopinka, Lamer), or use and discretionary use 
immunity (Laforest, J.) or use immunity only (L'Heureux-Dube, J.).91 
Extracting Commonalities 
Where does this leave ordered statements? The first important 
consideration is the entire panel in Thomson Newspapers agreed that ss. 1 l(c) 
and 13 are not the final statement on the right to silence and self-incrimination. 
Section 7 holds some "residual content" that extends to a situation not 
contemplated by specific provisions of the Charter. Second, the court was 
unanimous in finding that the appellants in Thomson Newspapers were subject 
to a deprivation of liberty under s. 7. Third, the context and consequences of an 
ordered statement may prove sufficiently troublesome for the court to provide an 
impetus for re-alignment on self-incrimination. Fourth, it is an accepted 
constitutional principle that either the purpose or effect (consequences) of a 
legislative measure can breach the Charter.92 It is on this basis that an 
examination of the constitutional validity of ordered statements can be initiated. 
89 Ibid. at 603. 
90 Ibid. at 443-444. 
91 Gold, Annual Review of Criminal Law 1990 (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 93-94. 
92 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] I S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart]. 
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ORDERED STATEMENTS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER 
Is There A Deprivation of Liberty? 
113 
Does s. 7 of the Charter afford officers a right of silence and non-incrimination 
during an internal investigation? Significant to this inquiry is the extent to 
which a police officer can be compelled to incriminate him or herself, either by 
ordered or derivative evidence. The first question is whether the officer is 
subject to a deprivation of life, liberty or security by being required to provide a 
statement? The Supreme Court agreed in Thomson Newspapers and Stelco that 
compelling a person to attend before an investigative board involved a 
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of s. 7 of the Charter.93 
Therefore, it can be asserted that a police officer is under administrative 
"detention" when providing a required statement; failure to comply can subject 
the officer to additional discipline under the Code of Conduct for disobeying an 
order from a superior officer.94 Justice LeDain in R. v. Therens, defined 
"detention" withins. 10 of the Charter, to include situations where: 
[A] police officer or other agent of the state assumes control 
over the movement of a person by demand or direction which 
may have significant legal consequences and which prevents 
or impedes access to counsel95 (emphasis added). 
Is there a delineation to be made between an investigator of the internal and 
statutory offence qua police? The internal investigator is acting under the 
authority of an act of Parliament (R. C.M.P. Act). It is difficult to assert that the 
internal investigator does not function as an "agent of the state," especially 
where there is a legislated duty to investigate the allegation. Moreover, there is 
a clear legal obligation on the officer to answer, and, significant legal 
consequences accrue for not answering. A charge under the Code of Conduct 
may be laid which could in turn lead to dismissal. Even without the formal 
detention analysis, there is a basis to argue that the officer under investigation is 
"psychologically detained," since the officer may believe that there is no choice 
but to answer, even though he or she was not ordered to respond.96 Even more 
93 Thomson, supra note 14 at 459. Wilson, J. notes that it is not necessary for the party to 
prove that all three components of s. 7 have been violated (i.e. life, liberty and security of 
the person). See also: Singh v. Can. (Min. of Employment & Immigration), [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 177. 
94 Supra note 5. 
95 [1985] l S.C.R. 613 at 642 [hereinafter Therens]. See also: Thomsen v. R., [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 640, where a seven panel court agreed with Justice LeDain's broad definition of 
detention. · 
96 Therens, ibid. at 643. As noted by Dickson, C.J.C. in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 773 (sub nom. R. v. Videojlicks), a court should not fail to consider 
114 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
disturbing is the fact that there is no right to counsel during an ordered 
statement. R.C.M.P. policy states: 
During an internal investigation, legal counsel or 
representative may be excluded when a statement is being 
taken or during the questioning of a suspect member or 
member witness (emphasis added).97 
It is true that a suspect in the criminal process may also not have a right to 
have counsel present during the taking of a statement, but the criminal suspect, 
as noted in Therens, at least has the choice whether or not to provide a statement 
to the authorities. The officer has no such choice. Moreover, the above policy is 
probably in violation of the right to counsel under s. lO(b) of the Charter. The 
officer is clearly detained (by legislative authority) within the meaning of 
Therens, yet there is no opportunity to instruct counsel. Even if the court 
constitutionally excepted this as an "administrative detention," it is still possible 
that there will be criminal consequences from denying (or impeding) the right to 
retain, instruct, and be informed of the right to counsel; the Force will have 
conscripted the officer against him or herself by seeking to utilize derivative 
evidence at a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
Questions about arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter are also raised. 
An officer detained under statute is required to respond to questions on the basis 
that there "appears" to be a Code of Conduct contravention.98 
As an interpretive aside, s. 50 of the R.C.M.P. Act states that "[e]very 
and recognize the "subtle and coercive pressure which an employer can exert on an 
employee." 
97 R.C.M.P. Administration Manual: "Internal Investigations," XII.4.E.3., dated 89-01-11. 
The following words of the majority in Big M Drug Mart, supra note 92 at 336-7 are also 
apt: 
Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as 
direct commands to act or refrain from acting on the pain of sanction, 
coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit 
alternative courses of conduct available to others (emphasis added). 
98 There seems to be little distinction between the consequences of this scenario and a 
charge under s. 129 of the Criminal Code for obstructing a police officer in the execution 
of a duty, or being found in contempt for refusing to answer questions before the R.T.P.C. 
These situations all carry a penalty for non-cooperation that is legislatively imposed. For 
example, if a citizen refuses to identify themselves after committing an offence the police 
have authority to arrest that individual under s. 495 of the Criminal Code. In Moore v. 
R., [1979] I S.C.R. 195, the Supreme Court found the principle of identification extended 
beyond "criminal offences" to permit an arrest for provincial offences where the officer 
observes the offence. Although the police officer who refuses to give an internal 
statement cannot be placed in gaol (unless of course there is a basis under the criminal 
law), he or she can ultimately be penalized by being dismissed from their position. 
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person who, (a) on being duly summonsed as a witness or otherwise under 
Part...IV ... makes default in attending .. .is guilty of a summary conviction 
offence" (emphasis added). It appears that this section contemplates testimonial 
proceedings of some sort; in fact, the other subparagraphs refer to 
"proceedings." The word "otherwise" in paragraph (a) could be construed to 
apply to an officer who has been directed to attend the office for the purposes of 
taking of an ordered statement. Does this mean an officer is subject to arrest by 
committing the summary conviction offence of failing to attend and give an 
ordered statement? Could such action result in a charge under the Criminal 
Code for refusing to comply with an Act of Parliament, because the 
investigating officer is in the execution of a duty authorized by the R. C.M.P. 
Act?99 Does "duly summonsed" apply to internal investigations at all? 
Clearly, a member of the R.C.M.P. who is being ordered to give a statement 
is subject to a deprivation of "liberty" in the strict sense of detention or coercion, 
and to the extent that failure to comply can result in further punishment. In part, 
this highlights the artificial and impractical administrative distinction made in 
Wigglesworth on the basis of penalty. 
PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
Is it contrary to the principles of fundamental justice that a police officer can be 
forced to incriminate him or herself? The context of this query is different than 
that of a person appearing in an administrative proceeding. First, unlike a 
tribunal, the disciplinary investigation is compelling an officer to provide 
responses which are not the subject of judicial scrutiny. Second, there is no 
guidance in the R. C.M.P. Act on the procedural implementation of ordered 
statements. As noted above, there does not appear to be a right to have counsel 
present during questioning. Third, the internal investigative process does not 
even achieve the "inquisitorial" threshold discussed by Laforest, J. in Thomson 
Newspapers. 100 There is no independent moderator to ensure that the nature and 
extent of the interrogation is properly limited. For example, does failing to 
respond to a question that may be irrelevant result in a contravention of the Code 
of Conduct? Are questions limited to the conduct under investigation, or, is it a 
dock from which "fishing expeditions"101 can be launched? Fourth, the officer is 
being investigated where there "appears" to be an infraction of the Code of 
99 Provisions of the Criminal Code apply to offences created by an Act of Parliament. 
See: Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s.34(2). 
100 Supra note 14. 
101 E. Ratushny, Self Incrimination In The Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1979) at 349. 
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Conduct. What is the meaning of appears? Is the threshold a mere suspicion, 
reasonable grounds, or balance of probabilities? There is no clear elucidation of 
the term. The threshold to institute an investigation may be almost non-existent, 
and, indeed, perhaps arbitrary. 
Given the serious consequences of a formal disciplinary action, one must 
ask if it is reasonable for a member to rely on the protection provided under s. 
40(3) of the R. C.M.P. Act. What prevents the R.C.M.P from using an ordered 
statement as a mechanism to obtain evidence for the purpose of conducting a 
criminal investigation? As previously stated by Commissioner Simmonds, the 
ordered statement permits the Force to obtain "independent evidence" arising 
out of the statement. 
Both L'Heureux-Dube and LaForest, JJ. placed considerable emphasis on 
the fact that the Canada Evidence Act and Charter implicitly recognized that 
derivative use protection was not available to a witness in the context of an 
administrative or judicial proceeding. The gravamen of this argument appears to 
hinge on the fact that it involves a "proceeding" of some sort. Yet, unlike the 
"witness" appearing before the R.T.P.C. in Thomson Newspapers, the Force 
initiates its investigation against a suspect member, based on the preliminary 
determination that there has been a violation of the Code of Conduct. The aim 
of the internal investigation is not to determine if there are grounds upon which 
to initiate an investigation (which is the purpose of appearing before the 
R.T.P.C.) but to obtain evidence upon which to prosecute a case. Is it not a 
different argument entirely to assert that the same principles apply to an 
investigative process where none of the rules and safeguards found in a 
"proceeding" are applicable? Once the officer enters the interview room, there 
is no judicial scrutiny of what transpired. 
The lack of legal counsel should also not be under-estimated in this process. 
For example, R.C.M.P. policy states that officers are not eligible for legal 
counsel at public expense when they are a party to an internal proceeding that 
can lead to, inter alia, disciplinary action, discharge or demotion. 102 Even where 
there is no misconduct, officers in the normal course of duties can be the subject 
of numerous potential complaints which can lead to an internal investigation and 
ordered statement. Are officers expected to engage counsel at their own expense 
every time they are called upon to provide an ordered statement? Regardless of 
any misconduct by the officer, any reasonable and prudent member of a police 
organization would certainly desire legal advice. Yet, the personal costs would 
be prohibitive if an officer took this course of action on each occasion. The 
102 R.C.M.P. Administration Manual Bulletin A.M. 1786: "Approval of Legal Fees For 
Employees," 1.b.l., issued 91-08-15. 
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result is that many officers provide statements without the benefit of legal 
advice. Given the breadth of an internal investigation, it is a situation ripe for 
exploitation. 
There is no question that, based on Thomson Newspapers, Wilson, J. 
(expressly), Sopinka, J. (implicitly), and Lamer, C.J.C (by assumption), would 
find s. 40(2) violates s. 7 of the Charter, and is not saved by s. 1, especially 
where the statement provides derivative evidence that could be used against the 
officer in subsequent proceedings. There is no statutory prohibition in the 
R. C.M. P. Act to prevent the use of the internal statement for gathering criminal 
(or disciplinary) inculpatory evidence against the officer. Section 40(3) only 
states that no answer or statement can be used or received in a subsequent 
proceeding. This would not extend to the admissibility of real derivative 
evidence, which is a matter Laforest, J. would leave to the trial judge's 
discretion - only if the evidence could not have been located or discovered 
without the officer's statement. 
The analysis of Laforest, J. places two onerous burdens on an officer. First, 
the officer is required to abide by the requirement and to incur the legal liability 
of any administrative and criminal repercussions before arguing that the 
evidence was derivatively prejudicial. Second, the officer is required to prove 
that the evidence would lead to an "unfair trial." 103 This result, it is suggested, 
conflicts with the tenets of fundamental justice in Canada. 
The R.C.M.P. Act is novel to the extent that it requires responses from 
individuals outside the context of "proceedings" as identified in the Canada 
Evidence Act and Charter. Police officers under investigation for a Code of 
Conduct violation can be required, upon demand, to provide a statement that can 
provide evidence upon which a criminal charge could be based. In such 
circumstances, it is difficult to envision that ordered statements do not violate 
the fundamental principle of justice that individuals should not be required to 
incriminate themselves by any means in a criminal matter. The jeopardy created 
by the criminal application of derivative evidence obtained from the internal 
context, it is suggested, alters the focus of the s. 7 analysis. 
Although L'Heureux-Dube, J. would be satisfied by the use immunity 
accorded by s. 40(3), it should be noted that she made her comments in the 
context of the "legal tradition recogniz[ing] the usefulness of commissions of 
inquiry and other investigative inquiries." 104 The ordered statement is not 
obtained as part of the "testimonial" compulsion considered by L'Heureux-
w3 Supra note 22 at 103. Eberts argues that the individual is being forced to seek redress 
from the court if the administrative investigation is being improperly conducted. 
Intentionally or not, LaForest, J. has created a damaging judicial reverse onus. 
104 Supra note 14 at 583. 
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Dube, J. and it is possible her position would be different with respect to a non-
proceeding investigative authority. There can be a world of difference between 
a "testimonial compulsion" in the context of a "proceeding" and an 
"investigative compulsion" in the context of an "interrogation." 
Given the factional nature of the Thomson Newspapers decision, and the 
fact that it was limited to compelled testimony within a proceeding, there is a 
clear basis to assert that an ordered statement is not obtained in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice. This is particularly true with respect to the 
failure to provide derivative use immunity. 
Ordered statements have only existed legislatively in the R.C.M.P. since 
1986, although, as the Marin Commission noted, there was a significant policy 
change in the "Standing Orders" of the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. in 1962, 
authorizing a charge for disobeying an order if a member refused to answer 
questions during an internal investigation. 105 In 1976, the Marin Commission 
referred to the abuse of ordered statements by the Force as a cause of "mistrust" 
and "bad faith" between members and management. 106 This was also a topic of 
contention before the Legislative Committee, where Svend Robinson M.P., 
stated: 
There are circumstances which have been brought to my 
attention, Mr. Chairman, in which, in the guise of a service 
investigation, questions have been directed to members which 
really go to criminal investigations. 107 
The Supreme Court would hardly tolerate any citizen being subjected to a 
legislative authority that permitted the police to detain, deny counsel, and 
conduct forced interrogations for the purposes of obtaining derivative evidence. 
Why should an officer qua suspect be treated any differently? Clearly there is a 
need to ensure that officers who find themselves the subject of an internal 
investigation derive protection from the principles of fundamental justice, 
particularly in light of the related investigations and attending public obligations 
that can accrue to the Force in such a situation. In moving to a s. 1 analysis, 
certain fundamental questions about the treatment accorded to police officers as 
individuals will be raised. 
SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER 
If the court finds that s. 7 of the Charter was violated by an ordered statement 
under s. 40(2) of the R.C.M.P. Act, the onus would be upon the Force to 
105 Supra note 9 at 32. 
106 Ibid. at 153. 
101 Supra note 7 at 11:115. 
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convince the court on a "preponderance of probabilities" that it is a justified 
limit. Section 1 of the Charter provides: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has stated that both the purpose and 
effect of a legislative measure are capable of invalidating the provision as 
unconstitutional. 108 Although this approach is, for the most part, central to the 
initial evaluation of whether there has been Charter breach, it also provides a 
useful conceptual model in which to maintain an ongoing consideration of the 
underlying justifications surrounding ordered statements. 
Limit Prescribed By Law and the "Oakes Test" 
Ifs. 40(2) is a limit on the right against self-incrimination contained ins. 7, 
it follows that its inclusion in the R. C.M.P. Act creates a "limit prescribed by 
law" within the meaning of s. 1. To find that s. 40 is a reasonable limit 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society requires the satisfaction 
of both branches of the "Oakes test. " 109 
In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 110 it is generally acknowledged that 
Dickson, C.J.C. restated the "Oakes Test" to include a recognition that the 
criteria will vary depending on the context. 111 In this case, the context is 
disciplinary, but the criminal implications attached to an ordered statement, in 
the form of derivative evidence, must also be noted. 
Legislative Objective 
First, the objective of s. 40(2) must be of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding the right to silence and the right not to answer incriminating 
questions. At a minimum, the objective must be "pressing and substantial" in a 
free and democratic society. The government might be prepared to argue that 
police misconduct is at such a level, or could attain such proportions, that the 
need for internal discipline requires ordered statements. This assertion would 
10s Big M Drug Mart, supra note 92. 
109 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. lb3. 
110 Supra note 96. 
111 See also Thomsen, supra note 95, LeDain, J.; R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621.; R. v. 
Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, Cory, J. for comments on the contextual nature of the 
analysis under s. 1. It is important that the administrative "purpose" of ordered statements 
not be permitted to overshadow the criminal consequences that can arise. 
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most certainly be founded on the findings of the McDonald Commission into 
R.C.M.P. activities in the 1970s. 112 
According to the 1990-91 report of the R.C.M.P. Public Complaints 
Commission, there were 17,742 members of the R.C.M.P. posted across Canada 
and there were a total of 2,652 "public complaints" received by the Force 
regarding its members. 113 The P.C.C., however, provides no details on how 
many of these complaints were found to be unsubstantiated or vexatious. Of the 
complaints, 857 were received directly by the P.C.C.; of those, 488 related to 
"attitude" or "service," while the use of force accounted for 111 complaints. 114 
This data is open to interpretation as to whether it indicates a pressing and 
substantial concern with police misconduct. The number of internal complaints 
is not given. 
On the other hand, the purpose of ordered statements is to hold members 
accountable internally for their conduct, which is a pressing and substantial 
concern. The underlying premise is that without a mechanism to ensure 
disclosure of the member's conduct, there would be no means to apply 
disciplinary control. The problem is that the statement could have consequences 
that extend well beyond the disciplinary process. Therefore, ordered statements 
are not circumscribed or limited to internal control and accountability. 
The Proportionality Test 
This raises the second criteria, are the "means" "reasonable and 
demonstrably justified"? More succinctly, is the requirement to provide 
statements reasonable and justified? Has the legislature "balanced" the interests 
of society with the officer's right not to be forced to incriminate him or herself? 
Chief Justice Dickson proposed a three part "proportionality test" in Oakes to 
make this determination. 
Rational Connection 
First, the means, in this case the ordered statement, must be "rationally 
connected to the objective." More importantly, the provision for ordered 
112 D.C. McDonald (Pres.), Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Ottawa: Supply and Services, Report 1 1979; Reports 2 
& 3, 1981); also, J. Keable (Pres.), Commission of Enquiry Into Police Operations on 
Quebec Territory (Quebec: 1981) [hereinafter Keable Commission]; more globally, D.R. 
Morand (Chairman), Royal Commission into Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices 
(Toronto: Lieut. Gov's Office, 1976); R. Ouimet (Chairman), Report of the Canadian 
Committee on Corrections (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969). 
11 3 R. Gosse (Chairman), R.C.M.P. Public Complaints Commission Annual Report 1990-
91 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991) at 17-20. 
114 Ibid. 
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statements must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. 
This analysis would probably generate the most divisiveness on the question of 
ordered statements. For example, police officers may assert that they are being 
subjected to invasive investigative measures that are not required of other 
"professions" that administer considerable discretion and authority in society. 115 
It is probably valid to assert that an "accountability statement" is in the best 
interests of the Force, but there is also a serious question of good faith, in light 
of the obvious abuses to which the ordered statement can be turned. For 
example, in both its 1989-90 and 1990-91 reports, the P.C.C. advocates a policy 
that would require a statement from a member whose conduct is the subject of a 
"public complaint" under Part VII of the R. C.M.P. Act. 116 Apparently, when 
requested for explanations under Part VII (which is not a disciplinary 
investigation), some members declined to make a statement. In the P.C.C.'s 
view, members should have no option to decline to give statements, and the 
Force has not been zealous enough in resorting to an ordered statement as part of 
disciplinary investigations. 
If the R.C.M.P. were to bend to such pressure, an officer could be ordered to 
provide a statement whenever there was a complaint, whether or not it involved 
a contravention of the Code of Conduct. This would not appear to accord with 
the purpose of the legislation. It also highlights the arbitrary nature upon which 
a statement could be demanded. It appears ordered statements are a vehicle to 
which the P.C.C. would routinely resort, without any consideration to the 
obligations of fairness to the member. 
In Borovoy's view, "[p]olice officers are endowed with extraordinary 
powers for the protection of the public,'' 117 and, as such, are not exempt from 
providing a "reasonable account" of their conduct. Representing the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association before the Le'gislative Committee on Bill C-65, 
Borovoy conceded that R.C.M.P. officers are "especially vulnerable" to criminal 
charges, and in this regard, a limited immunity for answers was necessary; it 
should not, however, exempt the use of the answers in a civilian administrative 
action.118 A more detailed analysis, though, would reveal that individual officers 
are prone to systemic vulnerabilities not contemplated by Borovoy. 
115 D. Brown, "Civilian Review of Complaints Against the Police: A Survey of the United 
States Literature" in K. Heal, R. Tarling & J. Burrows, eds., Policing Today (London: 
H.M.S.0., 1985) 142. 
116 Supra note 114 at 43. 
117 A. Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1988). 
118 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-65, An Act to Amend 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue no. 6 (26 November 1985) at 6:7. 
122 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Some have suggested that such explanations are not unlike the 
accountability that arises in any employer-employee situation, such as an auto 
worker. 119 This analogy is a substantial and uninformed over-simplification. 
First, as Goldstein observes, policing is an occupation that, by its very nature, is 
often "adversarial," "emotionally charged," "hostile," and often requires 
"physical force." 120 The average employment situation in Canada does not place 
employees in situations that remotely resemble the occupational climate of 
police officers. Second, the auto worker probably operates under a collective 
agreement which, in most cases, sets out in detail the obligations and procedures 
for the employee and employer when an allegation of misconduct is made. 
Third, the R.C.M.P. is not unionized, 121 which, unlike unionized police forces, 
means there is no standing access to legal counsel. 122 The auto worker, as part of 
the union, has recourse to funded counsel and representation during an employer 
discipline investigation. As noted above, R.C.M.P. policy states specifically that 
a member will not be provided publicly funded counsel for internal disciplinary 
matters. Any "representation" provided by a Force lawyer (employee) at the 
hearing, by definition, follows the investigation. Fourth, although the use of 
ordered statements in a proceeding may be circumscribed, the use of evidence 
arising from the statement is not excluded by the R. C.M.P. Act. 
In general, there is no obligation on an employer to make or pursue a 
criminal complaint against an employee who has engaged in improper conduct. 
The police, however, have a legislated duty and social obligation to investigate 
criminal, public and internal allegations of misconduct; the Force is in a much 
different situation than other employers. Further, the finder of fact, in this case 
the R.C.M.P. as an organization, wears several hats: one as the investigator and 
evidence gatherer (internally and statutorily) and another as adjudicator. The 
auto worker may have to attend a proceeding, but, at least the adjudicator does 
not work for the company. 
Holding officers accountable is an objective of significant social and 
domestic merit, but it is not rationally connected to the arbitrary and unfair uses 
of an ordered statement. Even if concerns regarding the possible use of 
derivative evidence in a criminal process were not an issue, is it necessary that 
the Force have the authority to require answers for a Code of Conduct 
investigation, especially when the forms of conduct caught in this net can range 
119 Borovoy, supra note 117 at 254-5. 
120 H. Goldstein, Policing A Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub!., 1977), c. 7. 
121 Law Reform Commission, The Police - A Policy Paper by A. Grant (Ottawa: Supply 
and Services, 1980) at 36. 
122 Goldstein, supra note 120 at 111-22 outlines the effect (and importance) of having 
counsel for officers. See also: Lewis et al. note 6. 
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from pilfering paper clips to abusing prisoners?123 Perhaps ordered responses 
are necessary only where specific allegations of serious misconduct are 
involved, and all other reasonable investigative measures have been 
unsuccessful in illuminating the matter. 
Minimal Impairment 
The second criteria of the proportionality test revolves around whether the 
use of ordered statements impairs the officers right to be free from self 
crimination as little as possible. Under s. 40, a disciplinary investigation can be 
instigated when there "appears" to have been a contravention of the Code of 
Conduct. Given the low threshold, the ordered statement could be used as a way 
to "short circuit"124 the criminal and administrative investigative process by 
going directly to the member, instead of conducting a thorough investigation. 
For instance, a situation can arise in which the Force, in order to appease the 
public, may resort to an ordered statement rather than wait for the results of a 
thorough and complete criminal or internal investigation. The inability to rely 
on ordered statements may ensure management does not exploit this mechanism 
in the pursuit of a criminal charge. If the officer has committed a criminal act, 
the need for "public accountability" must follow. Should it, however, arrive on 
the horns of an "internal" accountability mechanism, which according to 
Wigglesworth, is not the object of domestic discipline? 
The Marin Commission conducted a thorough inquiry of the use of ordered 
statements and concluded: 
[T]he abandonment of the ordered statement will not alter, to 
any significant degree, management's ability to administer the 
Force with efficiency. 125 
The Commission received a number of submissions which argued that ordered 
statements had little credibility, and were not necessary to conduct a successful 
investigation. 126 In the end, the Marin Commission recommended that ordered 
statements be abolished. It is doubtful, then, that s. 40 minimally impairs the 
officer's fundamental right to justice and fairness. 
123 Sec. 39(1) of the R.C.M.P. Regs. states that "A member shall not act or conduct 
himself or herself in a disgraceful or disorderly manner that brings discredit on the 
Force." One wonders not what is included in this description, rather, what is not covered 
by such an amorphous charge. One of the few specifics is subsection (2), which notes 
that conviction for a provincial summary conviction offence (e.g. speeding ticket, or 
perhaps a parking ticket?) is a "disgraceful act or conduct." 
124 Supra note 101 at 348. 
125 Supra note 9 at 153. 
126 Ibid. 
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In this regard, the observations of Wilson, J. in Singh v. Can. (Min. of 
Employment and Immigration), are applicable: 
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by 
adopting administrative procedures which ignore the 
principles of fundamental justice but such an 
argument.. .misses the point of the exercise under s. 1. The 
principles of natural justice and procedural fairness which 
have long been espoused by our courts, and the constitutional 
entrenchment of the principles of fundamental justice in s. 7, 
implicitly recognizes that a balance of administrative 
convenience does not override the need to adhere to these 
principles127( emphasis added). 
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would be receptive to an argument that 
administrative efficiency and convenience in managing the Force is a basis for 
insisting that officers do not have the protection of non-incrimination. 
It has also been suggested that providing statements is merely a condition of 
employment, 128 one which the officer accepts upon joining the R.C.M.P. If the 
consequences of an ordered statement were strictly limited to administrative 
proceedings this might appear reasonable, but two points must be made. First, in 
1976 the Marin Commission found 25 percent ofR.C.M.P. "constables and non-
commissioned officers indicated that they had no knowledge or only slight 
knowledge" of the public complaints process. 129 At the time, an officer was only 
subject to an internal and statutory investigation. The invocation of the current 
scheme has created a legally complex and inter-related process of possible 
investigations and hearings that would mystify even the most capable legal mind 
(e.g. public complaint investigation and hearing, internal investigation, statutory 
investigation, inquiry boards, external review hearings). Without question, 
many officers are performing their duties with little or no understanding of the 
current accountability process, or the derivative consequences of providing a 
statement in an internal investigation. Second, a recruit entering the police 
profession probably has some notion that accountability is an important 
"condition" of employment, but there is a substantial likelihood that the recruit 
has no appreciation of the complex process. An officer is not advised by the 
Force at the time of engagement that he or she may be forefeiting the right to 
silence and non-incrimination. 130 
127 Supra note 48 at 218-219. 
12s Borovoy, supra note 117. 
129 Supra note 9 at 61. 
130 Equal treatment of officers in the criminal context was an important feature of the 
report by the Marin Commission, supra note 9. 
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At the end of the day, the question is whether the ordered statement is 
necessary to complete a thorough Code of Conduct investigation. It seems 
incongruous for a police organization - that is in the business of investigating 
and in possession of advanced investigative technology - to assert that it would 
be stymied and unable to hold officers account able without the ability to order 
officers to answer questions. Even if one accepts the administrative 
accountability argument, it does not eliminate the fact that derivative evidence 
from the statement could have criminal consequences. This is not to be taken as 
an assertion that police officers should not be held to a high standard for their 
conduct. It does not entitle the Force, however, to possess a mechanism that 
would enable the officer to be conscripted against him or herself for the 
purposes of successfully laying a criminal or disciplinary charge. 
It would be naive to believe that an internal investigator would not, either 
formally or informally, make known crucial evidence arising from an ordered 
statement that could convict an officer of a crime, particularly if it were heinous. 
This presumption assumes, of course, that the internal and criminal investigators 
are always different individuals. This is not to be taken as a criticism of the 
investigator's, rather, it points out what would be an incredible desire to do what 
is perceived to be proper, regardless of the legal niceties. Further, intense media 
and public pressure can prompt departments to ignore basic legal principles 
when dealing with individual officers. 
What happens if the officer under investigation declines to give a statement 
to the statutory investigator, and during the subsequent ordered statement 
provides evidence, which if true, would exonerate the officer? A review of the 
R. C.M.P. Act and Regulations does not provide any guidance on the use of 
exculpatory evidence. Given the significance of an ordered statement, is it 
proper to permit the R.C.M.P. to have an unreviewable discretion to use the 
ordered statement outside of a criminal, administrative or civil proceeding? 
Currently, the investigative process appears to be completely arbitrary, to the 
extent that no formal mechanism is available to protect officers during the 
acquisition stage of the investigation. 
Proportionality Between Effects and Objective 
The third and final factor in the Oakes test is the proportionality between the 
"effects" and "objective." In Oakes, Dickson, C.J.C. held that the more 
deleterious the effects of the measure on the right, the more important the 
objective must be for society. Despite establishing a rational connection and 
minimal impairment, the severity of the effects may still not justify the 
limitation on the Charter right. 
As the Ouimet Report notes, removing the privilege of self-incrimination 
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"places an additional and powerful weapon in the hands of law enforcement' 
(emphasis original). 131 Lewis et al., observed that the concerns of police officers 
regarding "duty statements" in the Metro-Toronto Police led to an agreement 
among management, the Public Complaints Commission, and the police 
association, that no statement would be required if the subject matter of the 
complaint could result in criminal charges. 132 This concession eliminates the 
argument that ordered statements are necessary to hold officers accountable in 
the discipline process. 133 The consequences of an ordered statement are not 
limited to one context and any argument to the contrary would be purely 
specious. 
It may be possible to sustain s. 40(2) if its effects were limited to the 
disciplinary forum. Because of the problem with derivative evidence, however, 
it is possible that the court would find the "deleterious" effects of an ordered 
statement disproportionate to its objective, particularly where the difference may 
amount to a criminal conviction, and not just a disciplinary disposition. 
It appears that a constitutional balance has not been achieved between the 
interests of the department (and society) in holding officers accountable, and the 
interest of the officer's individual right to be treated fairly. 
Alternative Results 
To find the Charter limitation justified under s. 1, the Force must convince 
a court that there is a clear delineation between internal and statutory 
investigations. Further, the Force must show that there is no possibility that the 
contents, or evidence arising from an ordered statement, would be the basis for a 
criminal investigation. This would mitigate any argument regarding the effects 
of the ordered statement on the member's right not to be placed in a position of 
incrimination. Thus, the statutory and internal contexts will be a critical factor 
under this head of examination. 
If the court found that s. 40(2) of the R. C.M.P. Act was not justified under s. 
1 of the Charter, it must declare the provision to be of "no force and effect" 
under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52 may also provide 
13 1 Supra note 112 at 68. 
132 Supra note 6 at 140. This was a 1986 article and it is unknown if this agreement 
continues to operate. For our purposes, this indicates that internal accountability is 
possible without the ordered/duty statement. 
l33 Commenting on the problem of developing procedures for investigating "public 
complaints," the Solicitor General's Report on the Future of Policing in Canada, 
observed that "one has to bear in mind the possibility that the authority of the department 
may be undermined and, with it, morale seriously damaged": A. Normandeau & B. 
Leighton, A Vision Of The Future Of Policing in Canada: Police-Challenge 2000 
(Ottawa: Sol. Gen. Cda., 1990) at 73. 
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several alternatives regarding the invalidity of s. 40(2) "to the extent of the 
inconsistency." Although the courts have been reluctant to read constitutional 
validity into legislation, 134 there are several possible alternatives here. First, the 
court could accept that ordered statements are necessary, but that derivative 
evidence is not to be admitted in any proceeding. Such a finding would accord 
with the statement of the then Solicitor General of Canada, Perrin Beatty, that 
the "proposed legislation [Bill C-65, 2nd reading] will firmly entrench the rights 
of members of the Force with respect to matters like internal discipline." 135 
Second, the court could read into s. 40(3) the condition that derivative evidence 
from ordered statements cannot be used in criminal trials, but is available only in 
internal proceedings. The comments of Lamer, C.J.C. on the possible 
inequalities that can arise regarding the application of s. 5(2) of the Canada 
Evidence Act in R. v. Kuldip, are poignant. He held that "it is up to Parliament 
to redress the unfairness by amending or repealing the problematic elements of 
the provision."136 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
If a court finds a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination under s. 7 
of the Charter, would the derivative evidence be admissible in an administrative 
or criminal proceeding? Recall thats. 40(3) precludes the use of the statement 
or answer, per se, in either proceeding. Before analyzing s. 24(2) of the 
Charter, it will be helpful to review several recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions that may affect the scope of s. 40(3), as well as the common law power 
of a trial judge to exclude evidence. 
Impeaching Credibility 
In R. v. Kuldip, 131 the Supreme Court of Canada found that s. 13 of the 
Charter and s. 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act did not preclude the Crown 
from using the accused's previous testimony at a second trial to undermine or 
134 In Hunter v. Southam Inc., (1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 the S.C.C. did not take the opportunity 
to "read down" legislation to meets. 8 of the Charter; however, in R. v. Holmes, (1988] l 
S.C.R. 914, Dickson, C.J. in dissent was prepared to "sever" words out of a section to 
meet the Charter; in Metropolitan Stores Ltd. v. Manitoba Food and Commercial 
Workers, (1987] S.C.R. 110, Beetz J., declined to make a position on "reading down" 
legislation to make it valid; some lower courts have been more receptive to managing the 
provisions to meet the Charter, see, R. v. Ladouceur (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.), 
R. v. S.(S.) (1987), 61 0.R. (2d) 290 per Grange, J.A. (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Chief (1989), 74 
C.R. (3d) 57 (Y.T. C.A.). 
135 House of Commons Debates, (I September 1985) at 6517. 
136 Supra note 16 at 638. 
137 Ibid. 
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impeach credibility. Leading a four to three majority, Lamer, C.J.C. found that 
the Crown is only prevented from using previous testimony of the accused if the 
purpose is to incriminate the individual. 138 Recognizing that the accused has the 
right to remain silent, it was reasoned that when the accused took the stand he 
placed his credibility in issue, and the Crown was permitted to rely on the prior 
inconsistent testimony, since it was not being used to incriminate the accused. 139 
This analysis does not appear to contradict s. 13 of the Charter, since the 
protection extends to preventing evidence from being "used to incriminate" the 
witness at a subsequent proceeding. Section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act 
states the incriminatory testimony is "not to be used or admissible in evidence 
against him" (emphasis added). Kuldip represented a fairly narrow 
interpretation on the protection provided by the Charter on the use of previous 
testimony. The question remains, does the phrase "used or receivable" in s. 
40(3) avoid the potential use of an ordered statement to attack credibility at a 
criminal or administrative proceeding? 140 
The Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact that the accused in Kuldip 
chose to enter the witness box to make the "statement," or testify .141 The officer, 
however, will have no such choice. An ordered statement will, in effect, force 
an officer to take the stand at an adjudication hearing if he or she wants to 
explain the derivative evidence that was disclosed. Further, based on the 
distinction in Kuldip, the "testimony" before the disciplinary hearing, albeit 
extracted, could be used at a subsequent criminal proceeding, as the member 
"chose" to take the stand at the disciplinary hearing. 
The Supreme Court confirmed in Kuldip that the protection against the use 
of previous testimony under s. 13 of the Charter "inures to an individual at the 
moment an attempt is made to utilize previous testimony to incriminate its 
author" (emphasis added). 142 On this basis, any protection of s. 40(3) concerning 
derivative evidence would not arise until the officer is before the tribunal, be it 
disciplinary or criminal. Therefore, an unchecked freedom exists to acquire any 
138 Ibid. at 641. 
139 Ibid. at 634-635. 
140 The Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154, s. 59(2) also states that incriminatory 
answers "shall not be used or receivable in evidence," which, given the findings in 
Ku/dip, supra note 6, would not appear to extend any exception argument for the 
protection offered bys. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act, to include a use immunity, because 
clearly this is not a unique legislative enactment. 
141 As we already know, and this was recently affirmed in R. v. Amway Corporation, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 21 at 29 an accused charged with a criminal offence cannot be compelled 
to enter the witness box. 
142 Supra note 16 at 629 Larner, C.J.C. See also: R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350; R. v. 
Mannion, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272. 
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evidence arising out of a statement, because the protection of s. 40(3) only 
accrues when an attempt is made to introduce the statement in a criminal or 
administrative proceeding. One wonders how frequently an officer can be 
required to succumb to an interview during a single investigation? Can the 
officer be re-examined every time a new piece of evidence is located? 
Disclosure 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada, building on the foundation of 
Boucher v. The Queen, 143 ruled in R. v. Stinchcombe 144 that the Crown has a 
legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence in a criminal trial. 
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, indicated that "all statements obtained 
from persons who have provided relevant information to the authorities should 
be produced notwithstanding that they are not proposed as Crown witnesses" 
(emphasis added). 145 The court accepted that the existence of a legal privilege 
could justify the non-disclosure of material, but "full answer and defence" for 
the accused will prevail. Such a privilege is reviewable on the ground that it is 
not a "reasonable limit." Is it now possible, on the basis of "full answer and 
defence," for counsel to request disclosure of ordered statements from officers 
that relate to a situation involving a criminal charge against a client? 
Section 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act states that answers are not to be "used or 
receivable" in a criminal or administrative proceeding. Nevertheless, if defence 
counsel convinces a judge that the ordered statement is relevant to making full 
answer and defence for his or her client, the likely result would be an order for 
disclosure, regardless of s. 40(3) or the fact that the statement was provided 
during an internal investigation. It would appear that there is little distinction to 
be made between the Crown and the police, and between internal and criminal, 
when full answer and defence is raised. There is no reason these principles 
would not also apply to the adjudication hearing. Presumably, as an accused 
before an internal or criminal court, the officer will also be able to demand 
disclosure of all statements taken during the course of the internal investigation. 
The privilege provided in the R.C.M.P. Act does not limit the use of 
statements to incriminate the officer; it refers to receipt in proceedings. If the 
veil of s. 40(3) is partly or completely pierced under disclosure, what could be 
the repercussions? It is possible that the statement would be released unedited to 
the defence, which could jeopardize ongoing investigations or investigative 
techniques being utilized by the R.C.M.P.? Certain personal details of the 
143 [ 1955] S .C.R. 16. 
144 Supra note 17. 
145 Ibid. at 345. 
130 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
officer could also be in jeopardy. The statement itself may not be used, but any 
activity disclosed in the statement that goes to the officers credibility could be 
used, as was the case in Ku/dip. Is it now possible for an individual to make a 
complaint against an officer, whether legitimate or vexatious, and use "full 
answer and defence" as a mechanism to access files of the R.C.M.P. pertaining 
to the conduct of the officer? This raises Canada Evidence Act and privacy 
arguments 146 that are beyond the scope of this paper; they are noted, however, to 
indicate thats. 40(3) is not as comprehensive as some may believe. 
Civil Proceedings 
The only judicial pronouncement on s. 40(3) to date has been by the New 
Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench (Trial Division), in Murphy v. Keating. 147 
The case involved a civil action initiated by the plaintiff as a result of a 
confrontation between the plaintiff, and members of the R.C.M.P. and Moncton 
Police Force. The plaintiff was arrested by the defendant R.C.M.P. officer and 
three Moncton officers during a visit by Prime Minister Mulroney, and sought 
damages for assault, battery, and unlawful imprisonment. In preparing for trial, 
the plaintiff requested an order from the court to have the contents of the internal 
investigation conducted by the R.C.M.P. disclosed. The defendant officer 
objected on the basis of the privilege contained ins. 40(3) of the R.C.M.P. Act. 
The court clearly applied a very narrow interpretation to "answer and 
statement." Landry, J. found that although the officer's statement was protected 
by the privilege contained in s. 40(3), the report of the internal investigator was 
subject to disclosure in its entirety. 148 It is not stated, however, whether the 
internal report gave a precise transcript of the officer's statement, as most do. In 
addition, any material collected, or other interviews conducted on the basis of 
the officer's statement, were also subject to disclosure. 
The New Brunswick Court also rejected the application of the "public 
interest privilege" in the confidentiality of police investigations. The court ruled 
that statements provided by individuals to the police do not fall within the 
privilege to prevent disclosure in civil proceedings. 149 If the officer was 
interviewed under s. 40(2), however, was the internal investigator acting qua 
domestic discipline and not qua police? If so the public interest argument in 
"police" investigations is inapplicable. 
146 For example, s. 37 of the C.E.A. and the common law permit objections regarding the 
disclosure of government information in the public interest. 
147 (1990), 96 N.B.R. (2d) 412. 
148 Ibid. at 422. 
149 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, in the Keating case, the internal investigator did not "order" 
the member to provide answers per se. In the affidavits before the court, both 
Keating and the investigating officer stated it was their collective belief the 
statement was "required" and therefore the privilege was operating. 
Recently, the Chairman of the R.C.M.P. External Review Committee issued 
"findings and recommendations" in relation to the meaning of "required" under 
s.40(2). In Special Cst. "A" v. The R.C.M.P.,150 Judge Marin (as Chairman), 
found the requirement to answer under s. 40(2), with the attendant protection of 
subsection (3), arises whenever an investigation under s. 40(1) is instituted. 151 
Judge Marin was of the view thats. 40 was more closely equated to s. 13 of the 
Charter, and, it did not therefore require an objection before the privilege 
accrued. 152 If the officer refuses to answer, the authority to order a response still 
operates. Judge Marin did refer to the Thomson Newspapers case, but limited 
his analysis to the comments of LaForest J. He concluded that members are not 
placed in any more of an "exceptional situation" than a citizen appearing before 
the R.T.P.C. 153 
With the greatest of respect, Judge Marin has chosen to agree with only one 
opinion of the divided panel that heard Thomson Newspapers. Further, there is 
some question whether the two situations are sufficiently similar to make such a 
broad generalization. At most, the witness appearing before the Trade 
Commission may ultimately face a "criminal charge," whereas the officer faces 
a panoply of possible internal, criminal, and inquiry consequences, not to the 
mention the disparate procedural protections available to the officer. The 
comments of Lamer, C.J.C. in Kuldip are apposite: · 
It is possible that, in certain circumstances, the rights protected 
by statute will be greater in scope than comparable rights 
affirmed by our Constitution. The Charter aims to guarantee 
that individuals benefit from a minimum standard of funda-
mental rights. If Parliament choose to grant protection over 
and above that which is enshrined in our Charter, it is always 
at liberty to do so (emphasis added). 154 
Although police officers are granted significant powers in society, it must 
also be recognized that they are vulnerable to a complaints process that can very 
easily become oppressive to the individual R.C.M.P. officer. 
150 R.C.M.P. External Review Committee File #2200-90-005 reported at (1990), 3 
Adjudicative Decisions 168 (R.C.M.P. Trib.). 
151 Ibid. at 17. 
152 Ibid. at 22. In contrast, an objection is required by the C.E.A. 
153 Ibid. at 25. 
154 Supra note 16 at 638. 
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A Common Law Exclusion? 
In 1971, the Supreme Court in R. v. Wray 155 virtually eliminated any 
discretion a trial judge had to exclude evidence during a trial. Mr. Justice 
Martland recognized that a judicial discretion existed to exclude evidence that 
operated unfairly against the accused, but not if the evidence was relevant: 
It is only the allowance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the 
accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous, and whose 
probative force in relation to the main issue before the court is 
trifling, which can be said to operate unfairly156(emphasis 
added). 
This test was restated ten years later in Rothman v. The Queen, where Lamer, J. 
(as he then was), citing Wray, found exclusion of relevant evidence was only 
permissible where it was "unduly prejudicial" and of "slight probative value." 157 
Because the trial judge has a duty to ensure that a trial is fair, there appears 
to be authority to exclude evidence which will countenance this common law 
principle. An officer ordered to give a statement might attempt to employ this 
avenue to object to the admission of any derivative evidence arising from the 
statement, but the threshold will be difficult to meet. 
Section 24 Analysis 
If there has been a violation of the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 
of the Charter, because of an attempt to rely on derivative evidence at either the 
administrative or criminal proceeding, would the evidence be excluded under s. 
24(2) of the Charter? It is necessary to establish that the Charter was violated 
155 [1971] S.C.R. 272. 
156 Ibid. at 293. 
157 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 at 687. In R. v. Sweitzer, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 949 a case involving the 
admissibility of circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court may have began a re-
formulation, stating at 953 that "admissibility will depend upon the probative effect of the 
evidence balanced against the prejudice caused to the accused by its admission (emphasis 
added). As noted in Thomson Newspapers,supra note 14, Laforest, J. indicated that, aside 
from the Charter, there is always an inherent discretion in a judge to exclude prejudicial 
evidence where admission would result in an unfair trial. This is a theme which he also 
surfaced in R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 asserting that a trial judge can exclude 
evidence if its "prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative worth''. See also: 
R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383. More recently, McLachlin, J, writing for a majority 
of six other justices of the Supreme Court in R. v. Seaboyer ( 1991 ), 7 C.R. (4th) 117 at 
139, accepted that Sweitzer properly stated the "general power of a judge to exclude 
relevant evidence on the ground of prejudice," perhaps giving more flexibility to the 
Wray formula. See: C. Boyle and M. MacCrimmon, "R. v. Seaboyer: A Lost Cause?" 
(1991), & C.R. (4th) 225. 
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in the course of obtaining the evidence. The nexus between an ordered response 
and any related Charter breach will be clear. Whether any derivative evidence 
was "discovered" as a result of the breach, however, may not be as clearly 
demarcated. The next consideration is whether the evidence should be excluded 
because its "admission in the proceedings would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute." The judgment of Lamer, J. (as he then was), in R. v. 
Collins, 158 identified three sets of factors to be considered for excluding evidence 
under s. 24(2). For our purposes, R. v. Strachan provides the most succinct 
summary: 
The first group concerns the fairness of the trial. The nature of 
the evidence, whether it is real or self-incriminating evidence 
produced by the accused, will be relevant to this 
determination. The second group relates to the seriousness of 
the Charter violation. Consideration will focus on the relative 
seriousness of the violation, whether the violation was 
committed in good faith or was of a merely technical nature or 
whether it was willful, deliberate and flagrant, whether the 
violation was motivated by circumstances of urgency or 
necessity, and whether other investigatory techniques that 
would not have infringed the Charter were available. The final 
set of factors relates to the disrepute that would arise from 
exclusion of the evidence. 159 
l58 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 [hereinafter Collins]. 
159 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 at 1006. See also: Broyles, supra note 66; R. v. Black, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 138 [hereinafter Black]; R. v. Greife, (1990] l S.C.R. 755; R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 3. It should be noted however, that Iacobucci J., in R. v. Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 
24 [hereinafter Elshaw], adopted the position that the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
"misunderstood the nature" of the Collins test by not excluding evidence that was found 
to adversely affect the fairness of the trial, despite any consideration of the other factors 
(at 44). Instead, Iacobucci J., in Elshaw, incorporated the minority statement of Sopinka 
J., from Hebert, supra note 33 at 207-8: 
This Court's cases on s. 24(2) point clearly, ... to the conclusion that 
where the impugned evidence falls afoul of the first set of factors set 
out...in Collins (trial fairness), the admissibility of such evidence 
cannot be saved by resort to the second set of factors (the seriousness 
of the violation). These two factors are alternative grounds for the 
exclusion of evidence, and not alternative grounds for the admission 
of evidence" (emphasis original). 
Stuart sees this analysis as "problematic," preferring to find that these "obiter" statements 
were not intended to create an automatic exclusion of evidence that affected the fairness 
of the trial: D. Stuart, "Annotation" (1991), 4 C.R. (4th) 125; given that other recent 
Supreme Court of Canada rulings continued to use the complete Collins analysis, and did 
not enjoin the automatic exclusion approach of Iacobucci, J. this development will not be 
taken as a new strict basis for exclusion under s. 24(2). See: R. v. Evans, (1991] 1 S.C.R. 
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Fairness of the Trial 
As noted by Iacobucci, J. in Broyles v. R., "the admission of self-
incriminating [evidence] obtained as a result of a breach of the Charter [sic], 
unlike the admission of real evidence which would have existed regardless of the 
breach, will make the trial unfair." 160 In this case, the Force would not be using 
"incriminatory" evidence per se, although the member was required to 
incriminate her or himself, since s. 40(3) excludes the use of the statement. 161 
The courts have held that real evidence, even if it is derivative evidence, 
does not necessarily render a trial unfair under s. 24(2), and can be admissible. 162 
Yet, the officer, not unlike an accused who unknowingly speaks to an 
undercover operator, does not exercise a choice whether to speak. The statement 
may not be obtained in a criminal-Charter context, but as noted above, the 
officer is detained, and subject to the power of the state, arguably within the 
meaning of Hebert. Because the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the 
right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination as "fundamental 
tenets" 163 of a fair trial, the introduction of conscripted derivative evidence 
would be unfair during a criminal trial of the officer. As for the disciplinary 
hearing, because of its administrative context, the court may be less inclined to 
find unfairness, in light of the non-criminal "consequences." 
Seriousness of the Violation 
A breach of the right to silence and incrimination in the criminal context is 
considered to be serious violation. 164 The internal investigator will seldom, if 
ever, be in a position to assert that an ordered statement was required to prevent 
the loss of evidence, or on an urgent basis. Furthermore, in most circumstances 
there will be other investigatory avenues that could provide the same evidence as 
the officer. There is a danger that required statements could be the subject of 
714 [hereinafter Evans]; R. v. Smith, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869. In any event, such a course by 
the Supreme Court would be advantageous to an argument that derivative evidence 
should be excluded, since they create an unfair trial based on coercion. 
l60 Supra note 66 at 617. See also Collins, supra note 158. 
161 Even without the Hebert analysis regarding the right to choose to speak to an agent of 
the state, it was settled by the Privy Council in Ibrahim v. R., [1914] A.C. 559 as per 
Lord Sumner, that in a criminal prosecution, the Crown, in order to have the accused's 
statement admitted, must establish that the statement was a "voluntary statement, in the 
sense that is has not been obtained from him either by fear or prejudice or hope of 
advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority." See also: Ratushny, supra note 
101 at 59; Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 376. 
162 See e.g.: Black, supra note 159. 
163 Supra, note 33, Hebert and note 158 Collins. 
164 Ibid. 
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abuse, particularly without any legislated priority as to the use of the s. 40(2) 
investigation. Are statements to be held in abeyance until such time as the 
criminal repercussions are addressed? For the officer, the res judicata of the 
criminal charge is the only true guarantee that the derivative evidence from the 
ordered statement will not arise prejudicially. Of course, this could result in 
problems of "unreasonable delay" in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing. 
Although "good faith" has been identified as a factor for consideration here, 
there is no assurance that an investigator, acting under the authority of s. 40(2), 
will be able to assert this authority as a valid basis for the admission of the 
evidence found as a result of the statement. In R. v. Therens 165 and Broyles166 , 
good faith is essentially rejected as a basis to mitigate the seriousness of the 
violation. 
As discussed above, the R.C.M.P. currently employs policy that permits the 
internal investigator to deny the right to consult counsel during the interview of 
a suspect member. If the officer is detained, and the internal statement produces 
inculpatory evidence that the Crown seeks to introduce at a criminal trial, the 
officer will be able to argue that there has been a violation of the right to retain 
and instruct counsel, and to be so informed under s. IO(b) of the Charter. If a 
proper nexus is made between the denial of counsel, the internal ordered 
statement, and the discovery of the evidence sought to be introduced in the 
criminal trial, the results should be constitutionally fatal for the admission of the 
derivative evidence. The Supreme Court has been exceptionally vigilant in 
ensuring that the provisions of s. 10 are met. 167 As Iacobucci, J. observed in 
Elshaw, "[a] series of decisions by this court, beginning notably with Collins, 
makes it clear that the exclusion of inculpatory statements obtained in violation 
of s. lO(b) should be the rule rather than the exception.''168 By extension, 
McLachlin, J. writing in R. v. Evans, concluded that: 
Generally speaking, the use of an incriminating statement, 
obtained from an accused in violation of his rights, results in 
unfairness because it infringes his privilege against self 
-incrimination and does so in a most prejudicial way - by 
supplying evidence which would not be otherwise available 169 
(emphasis added). 
165 Supra note 95. 
l66 Supra note 66. See also, Hebert note 33. Sopinka, J. indicates that some of the bench 
believe that good faith can never mitigate the seriousness of the violation. 
167 See R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, for one of the strongest statements on the right 
to counsel, regardless of the exclusionary consequences. 
168 Supra note 159 at 45. 
169 Supra note 159 at 896. 
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Although these comments also speak to the fairness of the trial, it is clear 
that any violation of the right to counsel is considered to be one of the most 
serious constitutional violations. Connecting the ordered statement to any 
derivative evidence, in the context of s. 10 of the Charter, will provide a 
powerful judicial impetus for exclusion. 
Effect of Excluding the Evidence 
The determinative factor on the effect of excluding evidence will be the 
effect on the fairness of the trial, and the repute of justice in the exclusion of the 
evidence. In R. v. Brydges170 it was noted that repeated judgments from the 
Supreme Court have held that the seriousness of the offence charged was not a 
justification for admitting evidence if it involved the fairness of the trial. It will 
also be important whether the evidence obtained as a result of the statement is 
essential to a conviction. This a double-edged argument; if the evidence is 
essential to proving the charge, it will only serve to highlight the significance of 
the s. 7 breach of the right against self-incrimination. 
In most cases, excluding the derivative evidence would not affect the repute 
of justice. In fact, the exclusion of derivative evidence would serve to reinforce 
the notion that the Force must conduct thorough internal investigations, without 
relying on transgressions of the right against self-incrimination to provide 
accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
Is John Lilburn in Uniform? To the extent that the officer can be ensnared by 
derivative evidence to prove a criminal charge, the answer is clear. The 
R.C.M.P. has publicly stated that it relies on ordered statements to obtain 
independent evidence. The inescapable inference is that the Force can, and 
does, use internal ordered statements to assist in criminal investigations. Given 
the right facts, a court would have difficulty in avoiding the constitutional path 
available under s. 7 to declare ordered statements unconstitutional as a violation 
of the right to silence and non-incrimination, or, by failing to provide derivative 
use immunity. The lack of "penal consequences" for a finding of guilt under a 
Code of Conduct contravention, however, makes the answer less resounding, 
perhaps because "disciplinary" punishments are not perceived to be as laden 
with the traditional stigma of the criminal process. Nonetheless, the 
consequences in the form of a suspension, ordered transfer, or dismissal can be 
as devastating for the officer. 
170 Supra note 167. 
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There are certain repercussive effects, within the current legislative scheme, 
that makes one particularly uncomfortable with the unregulated use of ordered 
statements for R.C.M.P. officers. For instance, there is no funded access to 
counsel, and, given the nature of the occupation and the need to be accountable, 
it would seem axiomatic that independent legal advice should be provided to the 
officer during every internal investigation. Further, if the officer did 
independently seek and retain legal counsel, the lawyer can be excluded during 
questioning. 
In a more general way, with the current trend in police accountability, the 
individual officer can quickly become susceptible to abuse by the accountability 
"system." Most critics of the police, in assailing the police organization, fail to 
perceive that the individual officer is not always protected or represented 
adequately in a process that can easily be abused by complainants, public 
review, and management, all of which pursue their own vision of justice and 
accountability. Sometimes, there seems to be an erroneous assumption that 
individual officers and police management are always responding to the same 
priorities in an internal investigation. 
Police officers, unlike most persons accused of misconduct, may not have 
enjoyed significant latitude in determining their course of action in a given 
situation. An executive can decide whether or not to engage in predatory 
pricing, while the police officer may have to act without time for reflection on 
the finite legal distinctions that can separate criminal or disciplinary conduct 
from permissible conduct. The truly deviant officer has nothing to fear; it is the 
well-intentioned officer who is operating in a world of conflicting and 
contradictory legal, policy and social demands that is susceptible. Frequently, 
"[l]aw, by its very nature, sometimes creates conditions that require the police to 
operate in grey areas, with no clearly defined expectations, until such time as the 
judiciary, legislators or the public provide feedback." 171 Accountability can 
become a manipulative and amorphous concept for the operational officer who 
is merely trying to manage a critical situation, particularly when it has become 
fashionable for the media and public to reach conclusions without knowing the 
details. 
In light of the findings by the Marin Commission, most acts of criminal or 
internal misconduct by police officers are prosecutable without ordered 
statements. In the final analysis, there seems to be an inherent contradiction in 
pursuing internal accountability by assuring the officers that their statements are 
protected, yet knowing that it permits the unaccountable acquisition of 
171 C.S. MacMillan, "Who Will Protect Those Who Protect?" (December 1989) Blue Line 
Magazine. 
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derivative evidence upon which to further other investigative agendas. The 
former Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. made it clear that his intent was to use 
ordered statements to gather "independent evidence" to be used against officers. 
Even if the R.C.M.P. does not currently employ this philosophy, appearances are 
as critical as reality, and the continued derivative prejudice that ordered 
statements can pose to the officer - particularly in relation to criminal charges -
must be recognized and addressed. 
In this regard, the following suggestions are made with respect to the use of 
ordered statements. First, there should either be an amendment to the R. C.M.P. 
Act, or promulgation of a regulation that prohibits legislatively the use of 
derivative evidence from ordered statements in criminal trials. Second, the use 
of derivative evidence in domestic proceedings, given their professed "remedial" 
purpose, should be limited to the most serious instances of misconduct where all 
other investigative methods have been exhausted. In this fashion, the Force can 
still require an accountability statement from the officer, but the derivative 
evidence will not be readily available. This last suggestion is premised on two 
factors. First, there are few instances when the Force will not be able to conduct 
a thorough investigation, either internally or statutorily, without a statement 
from the officer. Any conviction will usually be based on the strength of 
external proof, such as that provided by independent witnesses and physical 
evidence. Second, if the ordered statement really is to inform management 
about "what happened" and not to procure punishment, the inability to use 
derivative evidence will not be damaging. In the interim, the R.C.M.P. must 
take steps to rationalize clearly the competing interests of the various 
investigative mechanisms. This will ensure that participants are provided with a 
determinable procedure and priority for holding officers accountable throughout 
an inquiry of alleged misconduct. Ultimately, this will provide an effective and 
balanced approach to police accountability. It will be both fair to the officer, 
and protective of the Force's (and public's) interest in maintaining a high 
standard of police conduct. 
If Wigglesworth is considered to be the final word on internal and criminal 
procedures, an R.C.M.P. officer can be detained, denied counsel, interrogated, 
charged, and convicted, without Charter intervention. In an attempt to move 
beyond Wigglesworth, this paper has identified several constitutional issues that 
still must be addressed in the domestic investigative process, such as self-
incrimination, the right to silence, detention, and the right to counsel. In light of 
Thomson Newspapers, failure to provide derivative use immunity under s. 40(3) 
could be fatal to the survival of ordered statements under s. 7 of the Charter. 
Moreover, detaining officers without administering the right to counsel based on 
broad interrogative powers at the investigative stage, leaves the validity of 
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ordered statements constitutionally suspect. Therefore, despite the legislative 
requirement to answer questions under the R. C.M.P. Act, officers would be 
justified in declining to provide ordered statements until such time as the 
judiciary has considered these provisions. In the end, for any court to sanction 
ordered statements by admitting derivative evidence, at least in the context of a 
criminal trial, would be engaging in a monumental denial of the "full benefit of 
the Charter's protection."172 It would merely re-incarnate Lilburn in uniform 
within a modern Star Chamber investigation. 
172Big M Drug Mart, supra note 92 at 344, Dickson, C.J.C. 
